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Introduction
In the early 1920s, Alice Tanton, an eighteen-year-old college student, took

few wrong turns. She jumped

young man's car and rode around on the
streets of Ypsilanti, Michigan, sitting on his lap and smoking a cigarette. An
onlooker, who knew that Alice attended Michigan State Normal College
("MSNC"), reported her behavior to its Dean of Women, Mrs. Bessie Leach
a

into a

After affording Alice the opportunity to explain herself, Mrs. Priddy

Priddy.

expelled Alice from the college and MSNC's president affirmed that decision.
Alice (by her next friend) sued for reinstatement, but the courts would hear none

of

Indeed, the Supreme Court of Michigan stated

it.

condemning Mrs. Priddy, she should be commended
fashioned ideals of young womanhood."

flatly:

'instead of

for upholding

some

old-

1

In affirming the college's action, the Tanton court was merely embracing an
ages-old rule that had governed relations between students and their schools
These
since the very beginning of American colleges and universities.
institutions acted "in loco parentis,

students.

1

was

By

'

or, in

the position of parents vis-a-vis their

law, the institution had full authority to control the student's

Tanton v. McKenney, 1 97 N.W. 5 1 0, 5 1 3 (Mich. 1 924). The trial court found that Alice

guilty of the act described as well as "other acts of indiscretion" and that "she aired her

grievances
the

2

9

... in the public press,"

maintenance of discipline

which

in turn

there. Id. at 5

1 1

.

tended to prevent her return to the institution and

The Supreme Court of Michigan

also considered

very important the fact that the Normal School prepared students for the teaching profession. See
id.

2.

Literally, the doctrine

means "in the place of a parent." Black's Law Dictionary 79
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deemed

undesirable.

women were gaining increasing social
college
or university's regulations had to
challenging
Those
a
liberties.
overcome a strong legal presumption that the regulations were both reasonable
It

did not matter that in the 1920s
3

and

fair.

This Article uses the in loco parentis doctrine to offer a revised history of
intercollegiate athletics regulation and to critique, as well, the modern regulation
of intercollegiate athletics. It posits that, in the Nineteenth Century, when
institutions first began to give serious consideration to the regulation of campus
athletics, the in loco parentis doctrine provided the social and legal basis for
exercising broad controls over student-athletes. The Article further argues that
while the in loco parentis doctrine long ago met its demise in the larger college

and university context, in the field of intercollegiate athletics regulation, a
perverse version of that doctrine continues to survive. Under this mutation of the
doctrine, the alleged parent (the institution) continues to exercise broad controls

over the alleged child (the student-athlete) and yet the parent is unable to fulfill
its responsibilities in protecting the welfare of the alleged child because the
parent has an overwhelming financial interest in exploiting the child's talents.
Indeed, like the greedy parents of a financially- valuable child actor, institutions
have consistently pushed their charges onto more and more national stages in
pursuit of greater and greater financial returns, all the while insisting that their
charges cannot handle greater independence. And like many former child stars
arriving at adulthood, many student-athletes have begun to question their alleged
parents' motives.

Of course, student-athletes are not small children, and the very emergence of
the perverted in loco parentis doctrine in athletics regulation demonstrates how
far institutional athletics regulation has deviated

from the educational high road.

This strange strain of the doctrine also demonstrates why unquestioning judicial
deference to institutions in matters relating to athletic policies cannot be justified,
particularly

when

student-athlete rights are at issue.

But beyond deference, what is also needed is a model for removing the
conflicted parent as final arbiter of student-athlete rights and welfare. I propose
that an independent nonprofit organization, or several, should have the status to
identify and, where appropriate, assert student-athlete rights and interests. A
number of nonprofits currently exist in amateur sport, however, regulations and
interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association

("NCAA"),

prevent them from playing the role discussed here. These barriers,
arise out of a perverted form of the in loco parentis doctrine and are

now ripe for

I

will argue,

legal challenge.

This Article

is

a continuation of a project

entitled Student-Athlete Welfare in

first

begun

in

a Restructured NCAA.

4

an earlier work
In that work, I

(7th ed. 1999).
3.

In 1920, the Constitution

was amended

to give

women

the right to vote.

See U.S.

Const, amend. XIX.
4.

See W. Burlette Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare

in

a Restructured NCAA, 2 Va.

J.
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examined the

NCAA

history of the

which
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structure and the impact of the recent

essentially decentralized the

NCAA. As

does this piece,
Student-Athlete Welfare argued for reduced judicial deference in the review of
athletic policies as they affect student-athletes. It also took the unusual step of
questioning prevailing wisdoms regarding intercollegiate athletics history and
reviewed original NCAA documents, including NCAA proceedings. 5 The
attempted contribution was not only a proposal that courts should give less
deference to the NCAA and member institutions on matters affecting studentbut also the bringing to light of factual information from documents
athletes
6
that are even now largely unavailable to the public.
This Article takes that
earlier project a step further, reviewing these and other early documents to
determine what they tell about the considerations that drove early intercollegiate
athletics policy, where the policy now stands, and where it should be headed.
This Article has four parts. Part I investigates the role of the in loco parentis
doctrine in early college and university life. It posits that the doctrine had three
"legs": ( 1 ) a "control leg" allowed the institution to exercise broad controls over
students' lives; (2) a "welfare leg" tempered these controls by requiring that they
restructuring,

—

—

Sports &
5.

athletics,

L.

1

(2000).

While there are many publications
there

no

is

book

is

a useful resource, but

difficult policy issues that

its

Voice of College Sports:

have confronted the body and

is

primarily academic; thus,

academic deterioration overall

and the growth of the

1

—such

it

seeks to

as the rise

elective system.

See

tie

members. Moreover,

906- 1 98 1

intercollegiate athletics provides

empirical information primarily relates to the 1920s era.

its

See Jack Falla,

A Diamond Anniversary History

1929 Carnegie Foundation study on
its

upon the early days of

celebratory approach too often glosses

provides very few direct citations to guide serious researchers.

perspective

and intercollegiate

An exception is the NCAA's own commissioned history, written by sports

reporter Jack Falla. Falla's

over the very

NCAA

modern

detailed history focusing primarily

reliable

intercollegiate athletics.

criticizing the

some

(1

it

NCAA: THE

98 1 ). The famous

historical insight, but

Moreover, the Carnegie study's

the problems with sport to perceived

of research as a focus of educational

institutions

Howard Savage, American College Athletics,

Report of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching ( 1 929). Other sports
histories spend very few pages on the history of intercollegiate sport. Of these general histories,
the better ones are

Elliott
1

993);

1

850- 1 950

Gorn & Warren Goldstein, A Brief History of American Sports

Steven A.
6.

John Rickards Betts, America's Sporting Heritage:

Riess,

The only

to the present,
in the Library

is

Sport in Industrial America:

1

850- 1 920

1

in the

NCAA library

itself,

of Congress and even the

now

995).

located in Indianapolis.

libraries

of the

has some earlier documents for

sale, practically all are

They

institutions that
if any.

974);

(Eric Foner ed.,

place that this author has found a complete set of the proceedings, from

shaping early intercollegiate athletics have only scattered copies,

do not replace

(

(1

1

906

are not available

were instrumental

in

While NCAA Publishing

post 1967, and they informed

me that they

these volumes once the supply has run out. Given the difficulty of access,

it

is little

wonder that modern researchers have largely ignored these documents in discussing intercollegiate
athletics.

On

the other hand, the lack of access

may be

a direct result of a lack of interest

among

research faculty, itself caused by the bifurcation of athletic and nonathletic institutional realms. See
infra discussion Part II.C.
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be justified as necessary to protect the student's welfare or a larger public good;
and (3) a "deference leg" justified a strong presumption in favor of the
institutional decisionmaking, even against parental dissent. Part I then applies
this analysis to the history of intercollegiate athletics by looking at original
historical materials such as early convention proceedings of the NCAA.
Part II discusses the general demise of the in loco parentis doctrine in the
1960s and 1970s and the resulting expansion of freedoms that came to college
and university students. It seeks to demonstrate that student-athletes did not
experience the same broad expansion of rights as did nonathlete students and
that, indeed, during this period, control over student-athletes' behavior increased
dramatically even as institutional action to protect their welfare decreased. I
offer many reasons for this differing treatment of student-athletes and nonathlete
students, including the bifurcation of the university into athletic and nonathletic
I argue that
fiefdoms and increased financial investments in athletics.
strong
in
poses
conflict
of
interest
between the
institutions'
interest
athletics
a
alleged "parent" and the alleged "child." The result is a perversion of the in loco
parentis doctrine, one in which control takes center stage and welfare is shuttled
The courts protected this perversion because of a
to the background.
longstanding deference to institutions on matters deemed merely "educational,"

and a judicial willingness to assume that intercollegiate athletics programs were
just that.

By focusing upon NCAA legislative approaches in two subject areas, the
handling of student-athletes' rights to free speech and the handling of studentathletes' financial aid issues, including the rights of student-athletes who receive
athletic aid to work, Part III demonstrates how the in loco parentis doctrine
continues to be reflected in modern NCAA policy.
Finally, Part IV renews the argument for reduced judicial deference made in
Student-Athlete Welfare and investigates the option of using the vehicle of a
nonprofit organization or possibly several nonprofit organizations to provide
support to student-athletes involved in intercollegiate athletics. It argues that
such vehicles may present the best way to provide student-athletes with the
support that they need, support neither the NCAA nor its institutions can provide
in-house. The nonprofit organization need not be the only route pursued but
could complement other proposed avenues of student-athlete empowerment not
addressed here, such as unionization or proposals for payment of stipends to

—

—

student-athletes.

I.

The Early Relationships Between Colleges and Universities
and Their Students
A.

Today we

"In the Place

of a Parent"

are quite accustomed to college students acting as

young

adults

and exercising a broad spectrum of individual rights. Upon reaching the age of
majority, they may smoke and drink; they may vote; and they may associate with
friends of their choosing and spend their own money as they please. But such
was not always the case in the early days of American education, and it was

INDIANA
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certainly not the case

when
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colleges first began to notice their students' growing

interest in sports.

Nine colleges made up the first colonial colleges in America. 7 Many of the
8
early colleges were created to train men who could carry out religious aims. The
colonial college served the aristocracy of the times; its cost and the impractical
nature of its curriculum (e.g., the focus upon subjects such as Latin) made college
9
an unreasonable option for the average farmer's son. Soon colleges would begin
to grow in number, and the idea that a college education should be more widely
available, at least to white males, began to catch on, again often at the instigation

of religious institutions. 10
The colleges of these early centuries considered themselves

—

parentis acting much like a parent with respect to their students.
Bledstein notes of the Eighteenth Century:

loco

in

Indeed,

manhood" did not
period or era in human time

[T]he stage of behavioral development called "young
exist as a notable epoch, a distinct

characterized by specific events, unique problems, and a distinct culture.

College officials did not think of students as a special social group.
Students were children, being prepared for a calling, who needed to be
confined to a college or boarding school in order to survive the awful
temptation of worldly vice during the "midpassage" to adulthood. In the
self-contained college community, a student

was housed under one roof

with his instructors, and all proceeded together through the uniform daily
routine of prayers, meals, recitations, and study.

n

This lack of distinction between college students and students of more tender
years is also reflected in the Tanton decision, wherein the court compared the
powers of college administrators in that case as much like those of "school
12
boards in our country schools and boards of education in our cities."
Indeed,

7.

See Frederick Rudolph, The American College

and University:

A History

(Univ. of Ga. Press 1990) (1962). These colleges were "Harvard, William and Mary, Yale,
Jersey, King's, Philadelphia,
8.

See

id.

at 5-1

1

Rhode

Island, Queen's, [and]

Dartmouth."

3

New

Id.

(discussing religious influence in founding of schools);

id. at

(discussing lessening influence of particular denominations in favor of religious diversity at

16-18

some

colonial colleges).

BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM:
The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America 209 ( 976) (noting
9.

See

id. at

1

8-22; see also

1

that colonial colleges together graduated fewer than fifty students per year from 1701 to 1750,

primarily from elite families).
10.

See generally RUDOLPH, supra note

colleges in theNineteenth Century);

id.

7, at

44-67 (discussing the growth of access to

at 307-28 (discussing the development of women's colleges

and coeducational education).
1 1.

Bledstein, supra note

College 78-86

9, at

(1957) (discussing

208; see also

strict

George

P.

Schmidt, The Liberal Arts

codes of conduct and disciplinary sanctions

institutions).
12.

Tanton

v.

McKenney, 197 N.W. 510, 51

1

(Mich. 1924).

at early
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upholding the college's action, the court relied almost entirely upon case law
involving secondary or elementary schools regulating students of a much younger
age. In so doing, the Tanton court demonstrated the extent to which it and other
courts believed that the traditional in loco parentis doctrine also operated in full
13
measure on college campuses.
As demonstrated by Alice's case, the parental authority schools exercised
under the in loco parentis doctrine included the authority to mold the moral
4
Thus, like many other institutions of its day,
character of the student.'
Nineteenth Century Harvard College required each student, on pain of expulsion,
15
to attend church every Sunday.
As Alice's case also demonstrates, the right of the institution extended
beyond the campus. Berea College was not unusual when, in its 191 1 "Students
Manual," it prohibited its students from entering certain "[f]orbidden [p] laces
"16
including "any 'place of ill repute, liquor saloons, gambling houses' etc.
Berea' s rules further stated:
in

Eating houses and places of amusement in Berea, not controlled by the
college, must not be entered by students on pain of immediate
dismission. The institution provides for the recreation of its students,

and ample accommodation for meals and refreshment, and cannot permit
outside parties to solicit student patronage for gain.

17

The in loco parentis doctrine was not merely local school policy, it was legal
policy and courts adhered to it well into the Twentieth Century. The doctrine

13.

Without distinction,

in discussing this college student's case, the

Tanton court quoted

extensively from Ruling Case Law's description of the relationship between public schools and
their students

education.

and

Id. at

its

description of the court's obligation to defer to the

512-13 (citing 24 R.C.L. 574-75, 646 (1929)).

It

judgments of boards of

also cited

numerous cases

dealing with elementary and secondary schools.
1

4.

For a brief history of the doctrine, see Robert D. Bickel

of New Paradigms
Facilitator, 23 J.C.

Supervise Students:

Student- University Relations:

in

& U. L.

From

"In

& Peter F. Lake, The Emergence
Loco Parentis"

to Bystander to

755 (1997); Philip M. Hirshberg, The College's Emerging Duty

In Loco Parentis in the 1990s, 46

WASH. U.

J.

& CONTEMP.

URB.

(1994); Theodore C. Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of\n Loco Parentis, Tort Liability

to

L. 189

and the

Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471 (1990).
1

5.

ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER 88 -82, at 20 ( 1 882)
Harvard Annual Report 1881-82] (noting that the faculty thought prayers should

See, e.g. ,

[hereinafter

1

1

be made voluntary, but the board insisted upon compulsory prayers); Bulletin of THE University

of South Carolina 76

( 1

908) (noting requirement of morning prayers and Sunday service

attendance absent a parental excuse provided to the President); see also RUDOLPH, supra note

7,

at 75-76 (discussing compulsory daily prayers and church services). Bledstein notes that apart from

expulsion, a school's powers included "corporal punishment, fines, and deprivation." BLEDSTEIN,

supra note

9, at

209. Rudolph refers to the trend as "paternalism." See

103-09 (generally discussing college
16.

See Gott

17.

Id.

v.

Berea

RUDOLPH, supra note

efforts to control student behavior).

Coll., 161

S.W. 204, 205 (Ky. 1913).

7, at

INDIANA LAW REVIEW
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was such an important a part of the common law that
the courts before the 1900s,

and challenges

it

[Vol. 35:851

was

rarely challenged in

after that time, before the 1960s,

were largely unsuccessful. Thus, when a restaurant owner whose business
depended heavily upon student patronage sued Berea College to challenge its
prohibition of students eating at an establishment not owned by the College, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky justified Berea's action under the in loco parentis
doctrine.

The court

stated:

College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and
moral welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see
why, to that end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the
government or betterment of their pupils that a parent could for the same
purpose. Whether the rules or regulations are wise or their aims worthy
is a matter left solely to the discretion of the authorities or parents, as the
case may be, and, in the exercise of that discretion, the courts are not
disposed to interfere, unless the rules and aims are unlawful or against
public policy.

18

The court noted that the power extended beyond the school grounds "to all acts
of pupils which are detrimental to the good order and best interest of the school,
whether committed in school hours, or while the pupil is on his way to or from
19
school, or after he has returned home."
20
aforementioned case involving privately-supported Berea College
indicates, private and public institutions alike took advantage of the in loco
parentis doctrine.
While courts of earlier times regularly described the
relationship between privately-funded schools and their students as "solely
contractual," they regularly resorted to the in loco parentis doctrine to approve
institutional action, declaring the doctrine to form a part of the "common law"
21
of all contracts between private educational institutions and their students. And
while theoretically, institutions supported by the state faced greater restraints

As the

18.

Id

19.

Id. (citation omitted).

20.

Id. at

21.

See, e.g.,

relation

at

206.

205-06 (noting private

status).

John B. Stetson Univ. v.Hunt, 102 So. 637, 640 (Fla. 1924) (noting that "[t]he

between a student and an

no aid from the public treasury,

institution
is

of learning privately conducted, and which receives

solely contractual" and upholding school's right to expel

disorderly students under the in loco parentis doctrine and the

(quoting Vermillion

conduct in Stetson,
but the point

is

v. State

ex

if properly

that the court

rather than relying solely

rel.

Englehardt,

described,

1

10

"common law of

N.W. 736, 737 (Neb.

1907)).

the school"

The

student's

was probably sanctionable even under modern standards,

embraced a broad view of the college's powers of acting as a parent,

upon contract theory. Courts

contractual assurances of morality from students. See,

435 (App. Div. 1928) (affirming

also

e.g.,

backed private

institutions that

sought

Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 23 1 N. Y.S.

institution's right to dismiss student

on rumors

that she

was not

"atypical Syracuse girl" and citing express morality provisions in catalog, the referencing of those
regulations on student's signed registration card and the "wide discretion" afforded institutions to

determine when dismissal

is

appropriate under their rules).
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under the federal and state constitutions, the rights of students were not thought
of as broadly as they are today, as poor Alice herself learned.
B.

The Three-Legged Stool

This author proposes that we may describe the original in loco parentis
doctrine as having three key legs: (1) a control leg; (2) a welfare leg; and (3) a
deference leg. The control leg permitted the institution to place broad controls
on student behavior, such as forbidding a female student to ride in a car in public
while sitting on a man's lap or requiring a student to eat at college facilities only.
Balancing the control leg was the welfare leg. It provided justification for the
controls by positing that the controls were needed to protect the student's welfare
and for societal good. Of course, conceptions of student welfare were controlled
by the assumption that students were infants with no independent rights. Thus,
student welfare was difficult to distinguish from institutional welfare, except in
the most unusual cases. Finally, the deference leg gave the doctrine its teeth,
transforming the doctrine from a mere social rejection of student rights into a
legal vesting of power and authority in educational institutions. Indeed, courts
often backed institutional decisionmaking regarding students even when parents
22
The doctrine represented a governmental view that
took a different view.
educators were uniquely situated (unlike employers, for example) to shape the
character of those with whom they dealt on a daily basis and that institutions
could be presumed to perform this task of socialization to the community's full
control, welfare, and
satisfaction. I contend that each of these three legs
deference -were essential to a delicate balance that supported the in loco
parentis doctrine.

—

—

Using the In Loco Parentis Doctrine to Understand the Emergence
of Campus Athletics Regulation

C.

Commentators who have assessed

institutional involvement in amateur
have failed to take note of the fact that it arose in the shadow
of the in loco parentis doctrine. Indeed, I would argue that without the support
of such a doctrine, modern institutional control of amateur intercollegiate
athletics could never have evolved as it has.
Campus athletics began as unsupervised student games. Savage notes that
in the Eighteenth Century, athletics "were characterized by an almost complete
absence of anything approaching organization, rules, or what we now regard as
team games as distinguished from contests between sides." 23 In those days,
schools had little involvement in the administration of regular athletics. More
often, their "involvement" was in the form of prohibitions. The religious and
Victorian heritages of many of the early institutions rejected recreational physical

athletics regulation

22.

Tanton

v.

23.

Alice Tanton's mother, for example, joined in her petition as next friend to no avail. See

McKenney, 197 N.W. 510 (Mich.
See Savage, supra note

5, at

1

5.

1924).

.
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activity as contrary to

era frowned
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sound discipline,

upon sporting

24

and, thus,
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many colleges of the colonial

1787, Princeton forbade

activities. In

students to

its

game similar to hockey, decrying that it was "low and
gentlemen
and scholars, and is attended with great danger to the
unbecoming
25
Other institutions imposed similar restrictions.
health."
Campus sport, like the institutions in which it occurred, began to take off in
the early to mid- 1 800s. The growth of sport was fed by, among other things, the
growth of the colleges and universities themselves, the growth of towns and
26
cities,
the emergence of city athletic clubs and American
and
YWCAs, 27 the influx of immigrants who introduced the German gymnasium
movement, 28 and new ideologies of manhood that embraced vigorous physical
29
So too, the growth of professional baseball with its
recreational activity.
traveling teams had an impact, offering students summer opportunities to play the
play "shinny," a

YMCA

game/30
Sport posed a difficulty for early college administrators.
traditional

liberal

arts

It

was

not, in the

Some viewed

sense, an academic endeavor.

it

as

downright frivolous, even a socially dangerous activity to be discouraged. Over
time, however, a few college and university leaders began to believe that,
properly supervised, education in physical fitness (of which sport could be a part)
could add value to one's education. Institutions began to build facilities to

24.

Savage attributes the view to the English and religious heritage of these institutions. See,

e.g., id. at 14;

see also BLEDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 255-56 (stating that early colleges "frowned

upon games and sports as carnal and frivolous diversions, amusements both harmful
of a gentleman and subversive of the duties of a Christian
5, at

.

.

.

58-64 (discussing religious and Victorian objections to
25.

See RUDOLPH, supra note

7, at

1

50-5 1

");

to the

Gorn & Goldstein,

mind

supra note

sports).

Rudolph also discusses Rensselaer Polytechnic

.

Institute's similar ban on "running, jumping, and climbing" as undignified to the deportment that

"becomes a man of science."

Id. at

26.

This historical growth

27.

See,

is

151.

chronicled in a

number of scholarly books. See supra note

e.g.,BETTS,^pranote5, at98-101, 107-08. The YMCA was founded

in

5.

England

but spread throughout the United States in the 1850s as a predominantly Protestant Christian

movement.
28.

Id. at

107-08.

105-06 (discussing the German-inspired "Turner Movement" which promoted

Id. at

physical education training in schools and in the community); see also

Rudolph, supra note

152-53 (describing immigrant contribution to growth of the German gymnasium movement

7, at

in the

United States).
29.

Darwin's theories and the emphasis on the survival of the

backdrop for

this

Betts, supra note
start

5, at

91 (noting

how ideologies of manhood affected evolution of sport). By the

this trend, President

See discussion infra Part

30.

I.C.

See BETTS, supra note

Theodore Roosevelt was a strong supporter of

1

5, at

92-93 (noting that by

National Association of Base Ball Players and by

1

1

860 there were

fifty-four clubs in the

867 there were 237 teams). The Cincinnati Red

Stockings set the standard for traveling professional teams with their tour

more on student

formed an important

movement. See Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (1859); see also

of the 1900s, moved by

sport.

fittest

participation in these leagues, see

summer

in

1

869.

Id. at

95. For

baseball discussion infra Part I.C.I.

.

.

1

.
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support this "education," and to add personnel who could serve as educators.
31
Thus, Harvard built "the first American college gymnasium" in 1 826. Amherst
initiated a professorship in physical education

and hygiene

I860.

in

32

The

University of Chicago created a department of physical education and appointed

Alonzo Stagg as

33

Betts reports that by 1 890,
every
established
college
gained
or
"campaigned for adequate
virtually
had

gymnasium

its

director with faculty status.

facilities."

34

On their own, students soon took campus athletics beyond

intramural

games

as they initiated intercollegiate contests. Credit for inaugurating intercollegiate

Harvard and Yale who organized a
35
crew competition between the schools in 1 852. In 1 859, Williams and Amherst
36
students arranged the first intercollegiate baseball game.
In 1869, students at
Rutgers and Princeton organized the first intercollegiate football game (then a
game "more akin to soccer" than football today). 37 Also, in 1895 the first
intercollegiate basketball game took place between Minnesota State School of
38
Agriculture and Ham line College.
In those early days students ran athletic programs and teams, not coaches or
39
On some campuses, voluntary student-run athletic
athletic directors.
associations exercised jurisdiction over many different sports and communicated
with similar associations on other campuses. In some cases, the complexity of
these organizations was substantial, with team captains scheduling trainings,
40
practices, and game schedules.
At some schools, these groups financed their
work through membership fees, gate receipts, and fund raisers. 41
But as college administrators observed their students' increased voluntary
participation in sports, fears arose that sporting endeavors challenged many
athletics

3

1

32.

is

traditionally given to students at

BETTS, supra note

5, at

Bledstein, supra note

1

05

9, at

257 (speaking of Amherst and of this general movement

in

the 1800s).
33.

Hal A. Lawson

& Alan G. Ingham, Conflicting Ideologies Concerning the

and Intercollegiate Athletics: Harper and Hutchins at Chicago, 1892-1940,

7

J.

University

SPORT HIST.

37,

38-39,41 (1980).
34.

BETTS, supra note

35.

See, e.g., Joana Davenport,

Higher Education,

in

5, at

1

From Crew

SPORT & Higher Ed.

The Evolution of the Student-Athlete
also

1

SAVAGE, supra note

in

5,

to

Commercialism, The Paradox of Sport

6-7 (Donald

Chu et al.

eds., 1985);

Gregory

America: From the Divinity to the Divine, in

in

S. Sojka,

id. at

1

9;

see

5, at 19.

36.

Falla, supra note

37.

Id. at

38.

Falla, supra note

39.

See Clarence A. Waldo, The Proper Control ofCollege Athletic Sports, in PROCEEDINGS

5, at 26.

6 (noting similarity

to soccer);

Savage, supra note

5, at

1

9.

5, at 28.

of the Third Annual Convention of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the

United States
trainer, if there

40,

40 (1909)

[hereinafter 1908

was one, served

IAAUS Proceedings]

as an assistant to the captain).

40.

RiESS, supra note 5, at

41.

Id.

1

22-23

(noting that the coach or
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established value systems favored by their institutions. At the

same time,

it

was

apparent to many institutional actors that sporting events offered valuable
fundraising and advertising opportunities that, if properly tapped, could be of
great service to the institution.

—

Raising up Gentlemen Amateurs.
Foremost among the concerns of elite
institutions was the tradition of the gentleman-amateur.
In the Eighteenth
Century, American educational institutions saw their mission as raising
gentlemen, and to these institutions, the very essence of gentlemanly behavior in
This approach was also likely grounded in
athletics was "amateurism."
America's English heritage. According to one writer, the term "amateur" was
used to enforce the term "gentleman" in Nineteenth Century England. Indeed,
42
in that century the terms "gentleman" and "amateur" were used synonymously.
Another writer similarly points out that in earlier times an amateur player of sport
and music was referred to as a "gentleman" and that "[i]n some fields amateurism
was an honorable tradition, where attempts at full-time employment, to say
43
nothing of professional ization, were met with derision."
Indeed, it was
44
considered "despicable to make money in this way."
Thus, for those
institutions that shaped America's earliest athletic policies, "amateurism" was the
key ingredient that linked education to athletics. Amateurism meant many things,
but first and foremost it meant that students could not receive pay in any form,
including financial aid for play, and students had to be kept far apart from those
1.

who were

paid to participate in sports.

The problem of ensuring amateurism was a

one for the colleges and
universities that first encountered campus athletics. Seeking to better their
chances of success, college students sometimes permitted nonstudents, and
sometimes professional players, to participate on their teams. In cities and
towns, students often intermingled with such nonstudents in sporting activities.
During the summers, some of the better college student players traveled and
played with the emerging professional leagues, receiving, of course, pay for their
45
"work."
Under the in loco parentis doctrine, these on and off campus
frolickings were every bit the college or university's concern. In 1 882, Harvard's

42.

1

PC. MclNTOSH, SPORT IN SOCIETY 178 (1963). Mcintosh notes that the
athlete was considered one who had fallen away from the ideals of the ruling class.

See

professional

The

803 Oxford English Dictionary's

term to "polite"
43.

real

artistic

definition

of "amateurism" as

it

related to artists linked the

undertakings "without any regard to pecuniary advantage."

Id.

Roberta. Stebbins, Amateurs: On the Margin Between Work and Leisure 20-

21 (1979).
44.

A/, at 21.

45.

According to one report

in

1

870, a Harvard student baseball team toured

South, and the West, playing forty-four baseball games (both during
the

academic terms).

In 1882, the student

summer

New York, the

vacation and during

team played games with professional teams.

J.H.

McCurdy, The Essential Factors in the Control ofIntercollegiate Athletics, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE

Fourth Annual Convention of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United
States 55, 58 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 IAAUS Proceedings]; see also Harvard Annual
REPORT 1881-82, supra note 15, at 16-17.
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President Charles Eliot, noting the baseball games students played on Harvard
yard, emphasized in his Annual Report the need to keep college baseball players

"amateurs," separate and apart from professional players.
concluded:
It is

46

Thus President Eliot

also agreed that athletic competitions, though necessary to the

maintenance of a proper interest in the general subject, may easily run
into excess, and on that account need to be kept within discreet limits;
and that the whole spirit of College sports and contests should be that of
amateurs who are amusing themselves, and not that of professional
players who are earning a living, and seeking a reputation for its
47
pecuniary value.

Those opposing professionalism were from

society's upper crust,

and they

brought to the debate their own
sporting endeavors in general. Thus, in the 1880s, Harvard's President Eliot
stated that "[m]any people take it for granted that the students who are
[t]his is by no
conspicuous in athletic sports are capable of nothing better
48
means the case." Others argued that it was the professional environment that
made the professional a bad seed. The view was that the student-athlete needed
to be protected from the professional, lest the student be enticed by
professionalism and miss the point of play for its own sake. In a 1908 debate E.J.
Bartlett put the case this way:
stereotypes about the professional athlete and

.

.

.

[T]he athlete who plays the game for pay in vacation is not an aid but a
hindrance to the best in sport. He associates with and is managed by
men whose living comes from their success in sport. There are
professional athletes of high moral and ethical standards, but to hold to
them they must be of resistance superior to that of most men. The
professional athlete is the admiration of the sensual woman, the coveted
prize of the false sport who wants to buy him, the very implement and
object of enormous gambling operations, a golden sandwich man to the
cigarette maker, a sojourner in strange places where his warmest
welcome is in the bar and pool rooms. Naturally he is always looking
for his price. He must win to maintain his popularity. His livelihood is
at stake and his temptation is a little greater than others' to forget to be
generous in sport ....
Now the college athlete who has been breathing this air comes back
a little harder to lift to the rarer level of sport-with-nothing-in-it, a little
less ready for the chimerical standard of "a game well lost is better than

Harvard Annual Report 88

46.

See

47.

Id. at 19.

and Conflicting

1

1

-82,

supra note

Realities,

48.

comprised

it

5, at

1

7- 1 9.

See generally Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models
25 RUTGERS

L.J.

269 (1994) (discussing how, by defining student

participation in intercollegiate athletics as an avocation, the
initially

1

NCAA and the elite institutions that

embraced only one of two possible models of student-athlete

Harvard Annual Report 88
1

1

-82, supra note

1

5, at

1

8.

participation).

1

.
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a game badly won." He makes the college team his means of advertising
49
for another lucrative position

Thus amateurism also exemplified a kind of sportsmanship and an approach to
the

game that many believed professionals could not sustain.
Some believed that professionals were behaviorally of a lower

those who received no pay for play.

class than

50

Chicago's Alonzo Stagg argued that, while
professionalism was not ethically wrong, most professionals celebrated the
individual, not the team, and would not swear off tobacco or alcohol or adhere
51
to a strict diet for the benefit of a team.
Surely, providing some support to the anti-professional bias was a bias
against the class of persons who engaged in, or even worse, made their living
from physical activity. The early leaders of the American college and university
were from elite social classes in which men inherited wealth through family
membership, and their students were largely from the same elite classes. Indeed,
by the mid- 1800s more than seventy percent of Harvard College's enrolled
students had received their secondary education in private schools or been
52
privately tutored. Of course, even the most intellectually dense of the wealthy ' s
children inherited the appearance of success and the support mechanisms to
sustain it. Perhaps an assumption that others were simply not the best and the
brightest was a necessary rationalization. This view would be consistent with the
emerging social Darwinism of the mid- to late 1800s sometimes used to justify
53
It may also have been true that the uppercrust saw athletics
class stratification.
as a form of "service" unworthy of their lot, and that this factor led the elite to
believe that the proper place of their children, if they must be associated with
athletics, was in the stands and not on the ball field. Whatever the case, those
who were not heirs to wealth faced the practical problem of earning money. For
males at least, athletics was one available venue to accomplish this.
The assumption that amateurism is inherently superior to professionalism
appears later in the leading literature on the subject of athletics. Most notably,
it was embraced by Howard Savage in his 1929 report on athletics done for the
Carnegie Foundation. Savage acknowledged that amateurism was a "social
54
convention" that relied upon the assumption that "the man who plays a game
for fun, or for the love of it, or for sport's sake, is in some way advantaged over

49.

J.P

Welsh

et al.,

Debate:

Good Collegiate Standing Be
1 908 IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note

Should Any Student

Permitted to Play in Intercollegiate Baseball Contests?, in

in

39, at 53, 59-60.
50.
rejecting

See

id.

at

72 (comments of Chase) (acknowledging

that others hold this view, but

it).

64 (comments of Stagg).

51.

Id. at

52.

HarvardCOLL.,President'sReportfor 1873-74, at 8 (1873-74) (chart noting public

school representation in student body as hovering between twenty-four percent to thirty-eight
percent from 1867 to 1874).
53.

Darwin's Origin ofSpecies was published

54.

Savage, supra note

5, at

30 1

in 1859.

See DARWIN, supra note 29.
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55

Thus, Savage argued that "society"
maintains the convention of amateurism for its own good.
Savage also accepted the social bias that long haunted athletics and those
who played it. In response to those who pointed out that students with talents in
other fields such as music, writing, and art were permitted to pursue professional
interests (and so, why not athletes?), Savage responded that the "skills" needed
for music, writing, or art are "primarily mental or emotional" and that physical
56
By contrast, he
skill enters only as a part of the mechanics of expression."
the

a living at

it."

argued:

Sport involves the larger muscles of the human body and their
coordination, almost always in violent exertion. Its "skills" are primarily
physical; mental and emotional "skills" are present, but they vary

between sports. Sport in general implies the overcoming of opposition
of an obstacle physical, mental, moral which is immediate. The
resulting contest is carried on under certain conventions. Through the
relation of these conventions to the desire to excel, sport tests the good
57
temper and chivalry of its participants.

—

—

Thus, Savage and the Carnegie Foundation embraced the concept of sport as
58
It followed then that men who had
requiring relatively few intellectual skills.
the option of "higher" pursuits should be directed away from significant
attention to athletics.
2.

Preserving the Institution as a Place of Education.

—As they watched

many institutional leaders believed
much time on athletics and not enough

their charges' increasing interest in sports,

were simply spending too
time on study. Observing what he considered to be excessive time spent on
athletics, Harvard's President Eliot convened a committee to study athletics on
that campus and later argued that two hours a day of athletic involvement during
that students

the school year should be the absolute

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at

temper and

maximum

limit.

59

303. "These pursuits, in their more competitive development, afford tests of even

self-control, but such tests are in general not

offer opportunity for a degree of reflection which

of any stimulus."

may

sudden or violent;

in other

words, they

considerably delay and modify the reaction

Id.

304.

57.

Id. at

58.

Many argue that these stereotypes remain in existence today in varying forms. Arguably

the stereotype of black athletes as slothful and obtuse that

conscious and unconscious racism can be traced,
persons who engage

ofRacism

in

in athletics.

in addition, to stereotypes

attributed to

about the class of

See Timothy Davis, The Myth ofthe Superspade: The Persistence

College Athletics, 22

Fordham URB.

representation of African- Americans in sports at

have economic hurdles to

Timothy Davis has

participation,

may be

L.J.

615, 643-52 (1995). The disproportionate

all levels,

and

particularly

group sports that don't

traceable to racism's dramatic effect in reducing

blacks' other economic options.
59.

See

Harvard ANNUAL REPORT

1881-82, supra note 15, at 16-17 (noting that "the

elaborateness of the arrangements for match games of base-ball, and the frequency of those contests

1

.
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Institutions

institutional actors

—

found

increasingly

it

faculty, administrators, or

those purporting to act on the institution's behalf, specifically alumni.
To appreciate fully these concerns, one must understand the vision of
athletics that the amateur purists embraced. For purists, amateurism placed
restraints not only upon students, but also upon the institutions themselves.
Thus, they believed that institutions that held to the amateurism approach should
60
not use athletic events for advertising or recruiting purposes.
The institution's
obligation was to use athletics for its students' benefit, not its own. Thus, the

campus athletics to which many of those desiring to regulate
athletics aspired was athletics available to all students, not athletics restricted to
original

model

for

only the best players. Harvard's President Eliot argued:

When games are made a business,
and

they lose a large part of their charm;

college sports cannot approach the professional

standard of
excellence without claiming the almost exclusive attention of the
players, and becoming too severe, monotonous, and exacting to be
thoroughly enjoyable
Moreover, a high standard of excellence tends

to

make the number of persons who

actually take part in athletic sports

very small, the considerable number of tolerably good players being
driven from the field, and reduced to the unprofitable position of mere
lookers-on.

For

61

very reason, purists favored restricting college and university
involvement to intramural games, believing that the high level of competition that
intercollegiate play required simply made it inconsistent with a purely amateur
approach. This view would find its way into policy by 1906 when the NCAA,
this

62

then a loosely-aligned organization of some thirty institutions,
adopted a
resolution stating as an ultimate goal the decrease in intercollegiate play and
increase in intramural play.

The 1929 Savage

63

athletics should be available to all and that the

educational institutions.

amateurism was justified

in April,

May

and June

.

.

.

two themes: that
intramural model was the best for

report also harkened back to these

Savage argued that adhering to the principles of
64
by the intellectual mission of the college. He argued

prompted

this action," but that the inquiry

took a comprehensive look

at all sports).

60.

See James Roscoe Day, The Function of College Athletics,

PROCEEDINGS, supra note 45,

at 34,

in

1909

IAAUS

35 (calling the fact that schools use athletics for advertising

purposes a "notorious fact"); Waldo, supra note 39,

at

46 (critical of "faculties and

institutions

who

seek prominent [athletic] alliances for the sake of advertising and gate receipts").

61

Harvard Annual Report 1 88

62.

See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying

63

Proceedings of the First Annual Convention of the Intercollegiate Athletic

1

Ass'n of the United States 25-26 (1906)
64.

The

-82, supra note

1

5, at

1

8.

text.

[hereinafter 1906

IAAUS Proceedings].

Savage wrote:
presence of a

man whose prime

interest in college is

dependent upon payment for
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a socializing agency and that rejecting
professionalism was essential to "educational democracy," i.e., giving all
65
(Of course, this
students a chance to play athletics, not simply a select few.

that

the

is

reference to educational democracy as an American ideal was particularly ironic,

given the widespread acceptance of undemocratic approaches when it came to the
education of racial minorities and women.) Thus, Savage's report supported the
vision of the university as a place where athletics did not stand apart from other
university endeavors with unique significance, but was integrated into the
complete education and made available to all.

Amateurism purists also believed that specialized recruiting for athletes was
a violation of the amateur spirit. But on this subject in particular, institutions had
great difficulty controlling their

own

alumni acting on their
actors, alumni provided

actors, including

Often with support from institutional
preferences, payments, and other gifts to outstanding athletes to recruit them or
66
Taking
to lure them away from other institutions they might choose to attend.
advantage of such an environment, some students transferred multiple times in
order to take advantage of financial opportunities, thus earning the famous
behalf.

his athletic services delays and reduces academic instruction to his intellectual level and

speed, both in the classroom and in every other phase of college work.

concessions

at

It

entrance and at every point at which an academic requirement

invokes
is set.

It

leads in the direction of special privilege in tests and examinations, the relaxation of

standards of grading in class and in written work, the granting of special opportunities

when it is injured by the close attention to athletic practice
and much excusing from the obligation to meet academic

to repair academic standing
that subsidies entail,

appointments promptly and sincerely.

It

disunities the student

other undergraduates to feel that efforts to

men

institution avail nothing if

fulfill

body and soon brings

the intellectual purposes of the

are to be supported merely for the sake of winning

No other force so completely vitiates the intellectual aims of an institution and

games.

each of its members.

Savage, supra note
65.

5, at

302.

Savage described "educational democracy" as "that

characteristic

of our educational

process which vouchsafes to each and sundry equal opportunity to develop his habits and powers

of the mind, the body or the

spirit, in

accordance with his capacities." Thus, he continued:

The effect of importing subsidized or professional

athletes into

any

institution seriously

impairs not alone the incentive, but also the privilege of every other student to develop
to the full his interests and powers, intellectual, spiritual or physical. If college athletics

have the socializing values that are attributed to them, then the infraction of the amateur
convention usually gives to the man

a view

to financial return,

who possesses athletic talent, that he develops with

an advantage over his

less skillful fellows

which, because of

the desirability of victory, destroys at one blow that democracy of the playing field and

the river which
Id.

is

rightly

numbered among

the

most precious merits of college

sport.

at 304.

66.

Id.

at 22-23; see also

Preparatory Schools,

in

Myron

of Collegiate Athletics on
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL

Collegiate Athletic Association

T. Scudder, The Influence

57, 58 (1911) [hereinafter 1911

NCAA Proceedings].

.
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67

Faculty and administrators sometimes acted to
admit those with athletic prowess, even when they did not meet the academic
68
standards for admission.

Fearing that athletics would defeat both amateurism and academics,
institutional leaders concluded that one way to control athletics was take control
of it away from students and to give that control to educators who could monitor
the situation. The initial approach was to use faculty volunteers as coaches.
When this obligation became too burdensome, some schools opted for alumni
coaches with allegiance to the institution's principles.
But soon, many
institutions

began to hire paid coaches. Although a few schools hired

directors with faculty status,

more commonly

athletic

employed contract
them

institutions

coaches for only the relevant season with renewal possibilities and offered

69
The more successful of these non-faculty status
no additional faculty rights.
coaches were able to command significant salaries as institutions competed for

their talents.

70

Some pure amateurists viewed the very presence of paid "coaches" as
a step toward professionalizing college athletics.

itself

71

Moreover, the idea of hiring
coaches as faculty suggested they must be "athletics teachers," an oxymoron in
the minds of many academics. Even some of the institutions appointing full-time
athletics teachers denied them faculty security through tenure, thus hindering any

Welsh

supra note 49,

54-55 (referring to the "athletic tramp").

67.

See, e.g.,

68.

Savage proclaims, "Admissions requirements were cut as the railroad cut

Savage, supra note
professor"
69.

who

et al.,

5, at xvii; see

at

also Waldo, supra note 39,

at

rates."

See

45 (speaking of the "sporty

does not care for ethical ideals).

See Savage, supra note

5, at

22 (speaking of the 1 880s and early 1 900s). For more on

the evolution of coaching, see Betts, supra note 5, at 125; RlESS, supra note 5, at 124-26. In the

some

1920s,

colleges claimed that they had successfully integrated coaches into the fabric of the

See Proceedings of the Twenty-third

university.

Collegiate Athletic Association 20 (1928)
that

coaches

at Trinity

Annual Convention of the National

[hereinafter

1928

NCAA

Proceedings] (noting

College are assistant professors or instructors and "are paid by the college,

and not by the athletic association");

Hampshire Athletic Department

id. at

2 1 (noting that all but one

are regularly appointed faculty

handled through the business office of the

college).

established the position of athletic director. See

By

id. at

member of University of New

members and

that time,

some

that all funding is

institutions

had already

19 (discussing Harvard's establishment of

position and his membership in the faculty of arts and sciences);

id.

at

42 (discussing a regional

association for athletic directors.)
70.

See James R. Angell, Faculty Control ofAthletics, in 1 923

NCAA PROCEEDINGS 74, 77

(referring to "expensive coaching staffs" in football and attempts to reduce coaching costs at Yale

by making coaches faculty members paid on the same salary as regular
71

Thus, even as coaches seemed inevitable, opponents of "professionalism"

their involvement

by

insisting that coaches could only actively

coach before and

could not direct players from the sidelines during a game. See,

NCAA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 66, at 8,
limits,

faculty).

1

1

e.g.,

lines has

after

games and

College Baseball, in 1911

(noting that fifty-five colleges agreed with coaching

while thirty-five disagreed); Report ofBasketball Rules Committee, in

"coaching from the side

tried to limit

id.

at 3

1

(noting that

been almost entirely abolished from our college games

.

.

.").
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possible integration of them into the fabric of the institution.

72

Within the
NCAA, conferences with sympathy to the pure amateurist's position sought to
encourage their institutions to abandon the practice of affording coaches only
seasonal contracts. In 1 907, the First District of the NCAA reported that the New
England colleges were very much opposed to the so called "professional
coaches" persons who offered their services to institutions for pay and that
73
By 1911, the
Dartmouth had taken the lead hiring only alumni coaches.
74
University of Virginia had followed suit.
This writer believes that one can only truly appreciate this debate over
coaching and athletics if one sees it as part of a larger multifaceted debate about
the role of specialized training in educational institutions. Certainly, as noted
earlier, there was unique resistance to recognizing athletics as a legitimate part
of any educational program. That resistance had its own permutations, but it was
also part of a larger debate over the legitimacy of formal training for any
specialized trade or professional activity, including, for example, special training
in law. In the late 1 800s, the term "college" referred to the free standing liberal
arts college while the term "university" encompassed many so-called practical
training schools, like law schools, that undergraduates could attend instead of
5
college? Defenders of the colleges and the liberal arts tradition were noting an
emerging pressure to offer professional training, an approach that they believed
would dilute the very "learning-for-learning's-sake" approach that was
76
Thus, amateurism
considered to be the lifeblood of the liberal arts college.

—

—

NCAA

1928

72.

PROCEEDINGS, supra note 69,

at

20

(Trinity College representative

expressing doubt that coaches could be tenured there given the dependence on winning and losing);
see also

Thomas

F.

Moran, Courtesy and Sportsmanship

in Intercollegiate Athletics, in

4909

IAAUS Proceedings, supra note 45, at 64-66 (discussing different hiring approaches for coaches
then used

—

professional coaches for the season, alumni coaches and coaches hired under short-term

faculty contracts).
73.

Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention of the Intercollegiate

Athletic Association of the United States

7-8

(1907)

[hereinafter

1907

IAAUS

Proceedings].
74.

See

75.

See, e.g.,

1

91

1

NCAA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 66, at
SCHMIDT, supra note

See generally SCHMIDT, supra note

1 1 ,

at

Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32

1

1 1

,

at

1

1

60; see also

5.

Rudolph, supra note

76.

The

Ga.

L.

Rev.

I,

73 (1997) (discussing law schools as
late 1800s).

bias against professionalism helped create the separation
its

329-54.

46-67 (discussing the university movement); W. Burlette

undergraduate programs and the college/university dichotomy of the

undergraduate studies and

7, at

of law from other

elevation to the status of a graduate program.

opposition to the teaching of law, Christopher

Columbus

Speaking of this

Langdell, a leader in the early law

schools' movement, complained that American colleges held the view that liberal arts training

served a greater public good, but professional training was pursued for selfish reasons and had no
larger value and that a liberal arts degree prepared a

man to

pursue any course, while professional

learning "is a thing to be 'picked up' by degrees, and acquired by experience and practice

Harvard Coll. Annual Reports of President and Treasurer 79 (

1

" See

880-8 1 ). These views, he

argued, "have been inherited by American colleges, and have been as assiduously cultivated by
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when they

historical liberal arts tradition

asserted that a student should study athletics as an avocation, for

its

own

sake,

and not for money.
It is

also important to note that the ability to press the position that one

should pursue athletics without pay was closely tied to an institution's financial
stability. Private institutions with substantial endowments or strong alumni bases
had less need for the advertising and financial possibilities that athletics
presented. Those targeting an elite and well-off student body did not to have to
consider seriously the financial impact of restricting pay for play upon students
in need.
On the other hand, state-supported schools, and others that lacked
endowments, and those that catered to a more diverse student base, had reason
to be more supportive of some financial assistance that would permit those
athletes who were not in a position to earn academic scholarships to play sports
without having also to take on a job to meet their financial needs. Thus, while
most schools agreed that pay from outsiders for play should be prohibited, they
disagreed on other aspects of amateurism, such as whether institutional athletic
financial aid should be prohibited.
These political battles among institutions had a profound effect upon the
institution's obligation to protect the welfare of the student under the in loco
parentis doctrine, even as their control over athletics and student-athletes
increased. As modern onlookers know, the theory that perceived abuses could
be ended through institutional control of athletics proved flawed.
Concerns for Student Safety? Student safety concerns also led
3.

—

In

modern times,

was a primary reason

for the creation

institutional actors to consider intervention into athletics.

writers have suggested that football safety
77

of the NCAA.

Football injuries certainly created the controversies that spurred

educational institutions to national cooperation, but they were not the reason

was wrested from the students. Rather, the
over athletics was spurred by perceived threats to

control of intercollegiate athletics

complete exercise of control
the gentleman amateur mission and the belief that greater control over athletics
would allow an institution greater control over its actors.
However, it is true that in the formative years of campus football, student-run

them as by

their English prototypes." Id. Thus,

callings of professional

supra note 75,

Howard

men

are

he complained,

"[I]t is

of a commonplace, humdrum nature."

a

common

Id.

notion that the

at 83; see also Carter,

at 74.

Savage, author of the 1929 Carnegie Commission report, opined that the yoking of

the college with the graduate university resulted

in the

subordination of teaching to research, and

the resulting "university" began to perceive of itself not merely as an agency for students to think

hard and clearly, but also a place where one could, "without fundamental education," receive
training in "all the vocations practiced in the
is

modern

state."

Savage, supra note

5, at viii-x.

"It

under this regime," says Savage, "that college sports has been developed from games played by

boys for pleasure

into systematic professionalized athletics contests for the glory and, too often, for

the financial profit of the college."

77.

See, e.g.,

Id.

Falla, supra note

http://www.ncaa.org.

5, at

1

3-1 5; see also

NCAA Online, History, available at

1

.
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safety was a growing concern.
Harvard
example,
sponsored
the
annual
"Bloody
Monday" football game in
students, for
which freshmen were sometimes violently pitted against sophomores. Under
pressure from the townspeople, Harvard ultimately stepped in to ban the Bloody
Monday activities in 1 860. 78 In his 1 893- 1 894 annual report, Harvard's President

play

was not above reproach and

a strong supporter of institutional control of athletics, observed generally
of football that "[sjeveral fatal accidents have happened this year to school boys
and college students on the foot-Ball field; and in every strenuous game now
played, whether for practice or in an intercollegiate or other competition, there
79
Fan behavior was also a
is the ever present liability to death on the field."
concern for those events occurring on campus. As is the case today, athletic
events were also occasionally marked by fan rowdiness, violence, and even
Eliot,

gambling

activity.

80

In fact, institutional involvement in intercollegiate athletics did not reduce

expanded the fan base and the commercial value of the sport
exponentially. By increasing game frequency and increasing the need to deliver
injuries; instead,

it

81

twelve deaths
from football were reported across the nation.
In 1905, football matches
83
resulted in additional significant deaths and injuries.
These incidents were so
disturbing that, in 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt called school athletics
administrators together for consideration of what might be done to save lives and
84
Still, the 1909-1910 season brought thirty-two deaths that
to save the game.
newspapers claimed to be football-related, including the high-profile death of a
West Point cadet in a game against Harvard. 85 In truth, not all of these matches
were on college campuses nor did all involve college students, but many of the
incidents involved educational institutions and thus, institutions suffered dearly
spirited play,

it

also increased the potential for injury.

In 1902,

82

in the press.

86

FALL A, supra note

78.

5, at 5-6.

Harvard Coll., Annual Reports of the President & Treasurer
[hereinafter Harvard Annual Report 1893-94].
79.

See BETTS, supra note

80.

5, at

17(1 893- 1 894)

220-24.

81
See Arthur G Smith, Conference Direction and Control ofA thletics in the Middle West,
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Convention of the
.

in

NCAA

55, 56 (1910) (noting that

when

students controlled games,

life

was simpler and the

introduction of the institution commercialized intercollegiate athletics).

82.

See BETTS, supra note

83.

Id.

84.

Id. at 127.

85.

See Report ofthe Football Rules Committee,

45, at 18, 19.

not

all

1

27.

in

1

909 IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note

Some legislatures were apparently considering making football a crime. See Football

Reform, in 1909
86.

5, at

IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 45,

at 24, 25.

See, e.g., Football Reform, supra note 85, at 27 (asserting that

were college students and not

ail

of those killed

in 1909,

deaths could fairly be attributed to football and also

charging the press with sensationalizing football death and injury

stories).

.

.
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D. Countervailing Concerns: The Perceived Financial Value ofAthletics
Despite their discomfort with sport, many institutions also recognized that
affiliating themselves with sporting events had tremendous value in an evercompetitive and increasingly expensive world.
To those willing to take
advantage, such events offered free advertising (and, consequently, increased
tuition yields), strong alumni and community loyalties, and favorable press
attention.

Retreating from athletics was not easy even for those institutions most
committed to the intramural model and amateurism ideals. Indeed, the public

was tremendous and widespread, and interfering with
that fervor was not to make the institution a popular actor. Thus, in 1895
Harvard's Eliot unhappily observed that student participants could not be blamed
for the problems with sport, for they were "swayed by a tyrannical public
opinion partly ignorant, and partly barbarous to the formation of which
fervor supporting athletics

—

—

graduates and undergraduates, fathers, mothers, and sisters, leaders of society,
87
and the veriest gamblers and rowdies all contribute." By the early 1 900s, editors

newspapers across the nation had already begun the practice of selecting the
88
"national champion" from among the best college teams.
Football became by far the most popular sport among the public and a
significant moneymaker for its sponsors. Riess reports that between 1 888 and the
1890s, gate receipts at Yale football games jumped from a mere $2800 to
89
$50,000, surpassing all other sports. One 1915 NCAA district report found that
in that district, comprised of Ivy League schools, football admissions were three
times that of baseball and eight times that of track and field and that football
made up more than seventy percent of all gate receipts. 90 The prospect of
at

charging the public for witnessing such events increased its value to educational
91
institutions which, much like today, were always in need of more funds.
Powerful alumni also supported football programs and tied their dollars to its

Harvard Annual Report
1908 IAAUS PROCEEDINGS,

87.
88.

1

893-94, supra note 79, at

supra note 39,

at

1

13 (decrying the media's practice of

having editors across the nation vote on a national champion

in intercollegiate athletics

"flaunting [the selection] before the college world"); see also 1907

note 73,

at

1 1

-

1

6- 1 7.

and

IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra

3 (noting earlier media critiques of institutions that used

games

for advertising

gambling purposes, but complaining of sympathy toward professionalism on the

part of

and

many

"metropolitan papers"); Smith, supra note 8 1 at 57 (regarding press attention to individual student,

athletes, noting that publicity

is

a "windy diet for a young

colt").

89.

RIESS, supra note 5, at

90.

Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention

of the

NCAA

1

1-12 (1915).

1

The

21

report notes that for

all

sixteen colleges in the conference,

including Harvard, Yale, and Dartmouth, total receipts were $544,000 and football brought in

$395,000 of that amount. Id
See Falla, supra note

91
note 5,

at

5, at

9 (mentioning gate

xxi (noting that for several schools

exceeded $100,000).

in

receipts in the 1880s);

Savage, supra

the 1920s the annual income from gate receipts
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continuance.

92

Opportunities to participate

in

873

or observe sport were likely also

marvelous student recruiting tools. However, athletics were also expensive.
Betts reports that in 1914, Harvard reported spending $160,000 on varsity
Most of these
athletics, Cornell reported $75,000, and Wisconsin $45,000.
93
expenditures went to football.
In these earliest days, football, more than any game, underscored the conflict
of interest that the alleged parent (the institution) had in fulfilling its obligations
The safety of students was severely
to the alleged child (the student).
jeopardized by a game growing increasingly violent, even as institutional
involvement increased with a charge to make it less so. Negative press attention
often in the context of institutional involvement
put
to football deaths
extreme pressure on institutions because it threatened their public relations. At
the same time, positive sports press attention on the game made it difficult to
withdraw entirely.
Considered in light of the in loco parentis doctrine, the decision to regulate
student activity in the sporting arena was different from other decisions a school
might make affecting student lives. Athletics pitted institutional obligations to
protect student welfare against an emerging institutional interest in financial gain
and publicity through athletics. This conflict of interest, arguably, created the
environment that inevitably led to a perversion of the in loco parentis doctrine.

—

—

E. Exercising "Control"

The

story of institutional involvement in control of athletics, particularly

a story of varied approaches ultimately reaching a
94
Before the
crescendo of institutions in a national organization, the NCAA.
NCAA's creation, institutions tried to take control through creating campus
intercollegiate athletics,

is

Sometimes these committees
would have alumni and student representation as well. 95 Support emerged for the
faculty committees with jurisdiction over athletics.

92.

See, e.g. ,

I

907

"some alumni of one
Amateurism,
in

to

in

id. at

1

AAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 73, at 9 (speaking of "conspiracy" of

institution to run in four or five football players'*);

40, 41-42 (speaking

of alumni willingness

order to have them play for the favored

institution);

alumni who "oppose and thwart college

activities"

and noting that "[w]hen the

... his control is often decisive

their

rich

Waldo, supra note 39,

influential

at

40-4 1 (referring

of students and student

alumnus happens to be a sporting man,

and usually malign").

93.

Betts, supra note

94.

Practically all four-year institutions belong to the

own

to finance student-athlete studies

faculties in their control

and

Luther H. Gulick,

5, at 130.

NCAA. Two-year

institutions

organization, the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics

(NAIA).

have
See

www.naia.org.
95.

See, e.g.,

Catalogue of the University of South Carolina: 1907-1908,

at

86

(noting that "[i]n 1896 the Board of Trustees adopted a resolution" giving faculty express power
to

determine the rules under which students of the University were to "be permitted to engage

athletic games").

in

South Carolina opted for an advisory committee consisting of two faculty, two

alumni and two students.

Id; see also

Harvard

Coll., Report, 1888, Report of Special

1
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creation of leagues or associations in which schools met to jointly set rules for
96
From such groups emerged the
themselves and their competitors.
97

These conferences served as
"conferences" first formed in the 1890s.
their
members
and soon became the primary rulemaking
rulemaking bodies for
bodies for intercollegiate activity, essentially replacing local faculty control in
that arena.

A

movement

amateur athletics first began outside the
colleges with the formation of groups by city athletic clubs. Among these, one
of the most viable organizations was the Amateur Athletic Union ("AAU"),
formed in 1888 by the New York Athletic Club. 98
Then, in the bloody football season of 1905, the same year that President
99
Roosevelt sounded the alarm, Chancellor Henry McCracken of New York
University issued a call to college presidents after a student was killed in a
football game involving his institution. At its first official meeting in 1906, the
group adopted the name the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United
100
States (IAAUS). In 1910, it changed its name to the NCAA.
McCracken's group of thirty institutions agreed "severally" to take control
national

to regulate

Committee on Athletics, Annual Report
issues).

(1888) (report of faculty committee on athletics

See generally Waldo, supra note 39 (regarding the need for faculty control).

96.

For example, Harvard convinced Brown, Dartmouth, and Princeton to join with them

in prohibiting baseball

games with

proposed alliance at that time.

Agreement with
Mar. 18, 1903.

professional clubs. Yale reportedly declined to join in the

Harvard Annual Report 88
1

Yale, Eligibility for Athletic

A

1

-82, supra note

1

7;

see also

Teams Fixed By New Set of Rules, Harvard Bulletin,

See 1906

IAAUS PROCEEDINGS,

NCAA formed its own football rules committee without these schools
1909

in 1909.

PROCEEDINGS, supra note
97.

5, at

group containing many of these same schools and a few others formed the

football rules committee in 1905.

were merged

1

IAAUS PROCEEDINGS,

73, at 18 (discussing

See RlESS, supra note

Collegiate Association

in

1

5, at

supra note 45,

supra note 63,
in

1

906.

at 18.;

Id.

at 22.

The

The two groups

see also 1907

IAAUS

NCAA measures toward amalgamation).

124 (noting the establishment of the Southern Inter-

894, and later the Inter-Collegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives

and other conferences).

Attending at the

first

intercollegiate

conference meeting were

representatives from Chicago, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Northwestern, Purdue and Wisconsin.

This conference was
the

known

at

various times as the "Big Nine," Chicago Conference, and

"Big Ten." Occasionally,

preceded the

NCAA

and

its

founding date has been reported as 1896.

See 1907

as

The conferences

organization's infancy, they in fact possessed the key

in that latter

regulatory power, not the national organization.
their impact.

later,

IAAUS PROCEEDINGS,

Southern colleges have joined and agreed

to

The reports of the various NCAA divisions reflect
supra note 73,

conduct their

at

9-10 (noting that a number of

activities

according to the Southern

Intercollegiate Athletic Association's rules).

1

98.

See BETTS, supra, note

99.

See supra note 84 and accompanying

00.

Palmer E. Pierce, The Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United

5, at

1

10.
text.

States, in

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
Association OF the United States 38 (noting the change to "NCAA" was to "secure a more
distinctive

name"

reflecting

its

national character).

1
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101

Article VII of the IAAUS
over the intercollegiate athletics movement.
Constitution stated: "The Colleges and Universities enrolled in this Association

severally agree to take control of student athletic sports, as far as may be
necessary, to maintain in them a high standard of personal honor, eligibility, and
102

The group's insistence
and to remedy whatever abuses may exist."
that the agreement was "several" underscores that these institutions were not yet
prepared to cede their sovereignty to a central organization. It would be nearly
five more decades before the newly-created NCAA gained the power to enforce
legislation against members and even more years before it would become the
powerful central organization so well known to those who monitored amateur
103
A decision was also made to
athletics issues between the 1950s and 1990s.
Indeed,
limit the NCAA's primary membership to academic institutions.
104
invitations from the AAU to affiliate were rebuffed.
As noted earlier, schools claiming to embrace pure amateurism initially
wanted no part of intercollegiate athletics. After realizing that other institutions
were marching into that world without them, they joined the march. The fellow
institutional travelers who made up the college and universities of this era were
a diverse group. The Midwest had experienced a substantial growth in new
educational institutions, and Southern institutions were still recovering from the
financial and structural devastation of the Civil War. The student-athletes that
the infant NCAA had to consider were not merely the sons of the wealthy. This
diversity, which would increase as NCAA membership grew, would eventually
yield a splintering of the NCAA into subdivisions representing different
105
Still, the institutions of this era had one
intercollegiate athletics philosophies.
thing in common: none seriously questioned the institution's right to control
student-athlete behavior under the in loco parentis banner.
fair play,

Thirty institutions listed themselves as original

101.

organization's constitution:

NCAA

members

that

had

ratified the

Allegheny, Amherst, Bucknell, Colgate, Dartmouth, Denison,

Dickinson, Franklin and Marshall, George Washington, Grove City, Haverford, Lehigh,
University,

New York

University, Niagara, Oberlin,

Miami

Ohio Wesleyan, Rutgers, Seton

Hall,

Swarthmore, Syracuse, Tufts, Union, University of Colorado, University of Minnesota, University

of Missouri, University of Nebraska, University of North Carolina, University of Pennsylvania,
University of Rochester, University of Wooster, West Point, Vanderbilt, Washington and Jefferson,

Wesleyan, Westminster, Williams, and Wittenberg. 1906 IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63,
1 1

.

at

Several other colleges were also in attendance as observers.
1

02.

IAAUS CONST,

art VIII,

reprinted in

1

906 IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note

63, at 3

(emphasis added).
103.
1

04.

For a discussion of this evolution, see Carter, supra note
See

1

906

IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63, at 24-25

4, at

39-59.

(noting correspondence from

AAU proposing a national intercollegiate association that allied with the AAU); 907 IAAUS
Proceedings, supra note 73, at 14 (recommending that NCAA not play with any classes of teams

the

is

operating under
105.

1

AAU rules and asserting the rules were inappropriate for college players).

See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying discussion.

1

.
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The Means: Institutional Control and Eligibility

A key question that these early founders considered was how control over
might best be exercised. To answer the question, the NCAA and other

athletics

embraced principles of institutional control, that is, the idea
through its faculty or president, and not students, should be

regulators certainly
that the institution

of intercollegiate athletics.
However, institutions were also aware that taking a hard stance against
institutional actors, including alumni acting on the behalf of institutions, could
yield financial and political repercussions. Thus, this writer believes that this
fact presented a practical dilemma for regulators, one that led NCAA founders
to conclude that controlling the student participant was also necessary path of
least resistance. Of course, students did not sit on faculties, nor were they
in charge

college presidents or alumni.
policies.

They did not determine financial aid or admissions

Students did not control the institutional actors

institutional values.

Still,

student control

consequently, an effective

way

was

who

jeopardized

the path of least resistance and

to monitor athletics programs even

administrators and faculty could not be controlled.

The

when

in loco parentis doctrine

provided a perfect springboard for broad controls over student athletic
involvement. Using this doctrine, schools sought to dictate to their students that
if they wished to play intercollegiate athletics, they must, at every level prior to
and including college, pursue it as "gentlemen amusing themselves" and not as
professionals seeking to earn payment or to gain a reputation.
The NCAA adopted this approach in 1906 setting forth aspirational rules for
its members. Article VI contained "Principles of Amateur Sport" in which the
NCAA rejected, among other things, specialized recruiting and athletically-based
financial aid. Specifically, article

VI

read:

Principles of Amateur Sport

member of this Association agrees to enact
and enforce such measures as may be necessary to prevent violations of
Each

institution that is a

the principles of amateur sports such as
a.

Proselyting [sic]
1

The offering of inducements to players to enter Colleges

or Universities because of their athletic abilities, and of

supporting or maintaining players while students on account

of their athletic

abilities, either

by

athletic organizations,

individual alumni, or otherwise, directly or indirectly.
2.

The

singling out of prominent athletic students of

preparatory schools and endeavoring to influence them to
enter a particular College or University.
b.
c.

The playing of those ineligible as amateurs.
The playing of those who are not bona-fide students

in

good

and regular standing.
and unsportsmanlike conduct of any sort
d. Improper
whatsoever, either on the part of the contestants, the coaches,

.
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106

While reserving the right of institutions to determine the specific methods of
prevention of violations for the principles set forth in Article VI, Article VII
suggested "eligibility" rules to affirm the principles. These rules:
Required full time enrollment for student participation;
Limited transfers by student athletes from school to school by
requiring, inter alia, that they have been in residence at least one
year before participation;
Prohibited anyone who had received pay for play from playing on a
team or offering services as a "trainer" or "instructor";
Prohibited anyone who had received pay for play from participation

1

2.

3
4.

in intercollegiate

competition;

107

by limiting

Essentially denied participation to graduate students

5.

eligibility to four years;

6.

Barred freshmen from play;

7.

In football only, specifically requiring class attendance

has participated
attendance two-thirds of the college year

that "[a]ny football player

without having been

in

who

by declaring
and leaves

.

.

.

in

which he played shall not be allowed to play as a member of the
team during the next year's attendance at the same institution."

The

principles further provided that "[candidates for positions

on

athletic

be required to fill out cards, which shall be placed on file, giving a
" ,08
The NCAA provided a
full statement of their previous athletic records
list of questions and the student was required to swear to his answers as follows:
"On my honor, as a gentleman, I state that the above answers contain the whole
109
truth, without any mental reservation."
Institutions also took steps to attempt to swell the tide of injuries. The
established a football rules committee to standardize the game and to
work with other existing rules committees toward the passage of rules prohibiting
110
dangerous play.
They sought to spur a professional corps of officials to

teams

shall

NCAA

1

06.

1AAUS By-Laws art. VI, reprinted in 906 IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63, at 33.

1

07.

Ironically, this

1

bylaw presumed

that

payment of training

table expenses (special board

provisions for student-athletes) could be allowed, but limited them to not more than the regular

IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63, at 34.
IAAUS By-Laws art. VII, reprinted in 906 IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63,

board of a player. See 1906
1

08.

1

at

35; see also Falla, supra note 5, at 25.
1

09.

IAAUS By-Laws,

art.

VII, reprinted in

1

906 IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63,

at

36.
1 1

0.

IAAUS By-Laws art.

Institutions other than the

V, reprinted in 1 906 IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63,

NCAA also tried to curb football

injury. See, e.g., id. at 25-26;

A. Smith, Harvard and Columbia anda Reconsideration ofthe
History 5 (1981); James S. Watterson,

Eastern "Big Three", 8

J.

III,

SPORT HIST. 33

1

at 33.

Ronald

905-06 Football Crisis, 8 J. Sports

The Football Crisis of 1909-10: The Response of the
(1981).
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M

Because the NCAA had no power to enforce its own rules and was not yet
even recognized as a national legislative power, it was careful not to promulgate
too many rules. However, the conferences were legislative bodies and, by this
time, had already begun rulemaking. Changes instituted by some in these early
days included: local or regional prohibitions on intercollegiate play by freshmen,
one-year residence rules limiting transfers, rules limiting intercollegiate play to
undergraduates only, limitations on practice periods, and an end to training
tables, which separated athletes from other students for eating but provided
112
meals.
Thus, institutions concluded that the best means for gaining control over
intercollegiate athletics was to assume institutional control over athletics. This
was done by claiming intercollegiate athletics as a kind of institutional property
to which students could have access or "eligibility" only if they abided by certain
rules. The in loco parentis doctrine played a key role in these institutional
efforts. It provided the social and legal grounds for exercising broad controls
over students in the name of preserving their charges as gentleman amateurs. At
the same time, this traditional model of amateurism also imposed an obligation
upon the institution to avoid commercialization of athletics and to operate
athletics programs for student-athlete welfare.
The in loco parentis doctrine continued thereafter to affect the way that
athletic institutions viewed the rights of student-athletes. A romantic version of
the college or university as superparent, with the ability to even outthink the
natural parent, is expressed in following comments at the 1935 NCAA
convention.

Our primary interest is in the boy. When his parent turns him over to the
school, or to the college,

it

represents, in

my

mind, one of the greatest

acts of trust and faith that a man can make, because, however incoherent

he may be of putting into precise
he wishes us to do for the boy,
we know what he wishes. We are not dependent upon his statement. He
wishes us to take that boy and to give him, on every side of his life, the

the parent

words

may be, however incapable

in his talks with us

what

it is

that

kind of training that will fit him for intelligent, disciplined, generous
manhood and strong citizenship in this country. That is what he wishes.
He wishes us to realize for him all his hopes in the boy who bears his
name and who is to follow in his footsteps.
There can be no greater act of faith, no greater act of trust,
gentlemen, than that

m

111.
said" that

Harvard Annual Report 1 893-94, supra note 79, at 7 (rejecting view "often
by "employing more men to watch the players, with authority to punish instantly
Butcf.

1

infractions of the rules, foul and vicious playing could be stopped").

112.

E.g.,

1906

IAAUS PROCEEDINGS,

relating to these points in the Western and

113.

supra note 63,

at

18-19 (discussing various rules

Ohio Conferences).

Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual
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financial

interests

of

institutions in athletics challenged the trust inherent in the in loco parentis

doctrine and undercut

its

welfare

leg.

The

financial interest in perpetuating sport and

between the

conflict

institution's

interest in protecting the welfare

its

of the athlete continued to drive a wedge between parent and child as the
commercial value of athletics and the pressure to grow athletics programs
continued to rise.
II.

The Death Knell for In Loco Parentis

Ironically, even as educational institutions

were exercising more and more

control over student-athletes, the application of the in loco parentis doctrine was

waning as

it

applied to the larger student body.

The General Student Body

A.

As

the decades progressed, courts began to cut back on

all

three legs of the

loco parentis doctrine as it applied generally to colleges and universities. The
student led campus protests of the 1960s and other instances of student rebellion
against authority forced a new conception of the relationship between the student
and the university. A number of court decisions confirmed that students of all
ages were entitled to First Amendment protections, including freedom of speech
114
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court called the university
and associational rights.
in

classroom "peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.'"

Convention of the NCAA,
114.

In

at

( 1

935) [hereinafter

1969, the Supreme Court determined

Community School District, 393

Amendment to the U.S.
Id. at

1

1

The

courts also declared

935 Proceedings].
in

Tinker

v.

Des Moines Independent

U.S. 503 (1969), that high school students had a right in the First

Constitution to wear black armbands in quiet protest of the Vietnam war.

514; see also Bd. of Educ, Island Trees Union Free Sch.

(1982) (finding that public school board

books approved by teachers and

667 (1973) (holding

115

may have

violated First

parents); Papish v. Bd.

that university expulsion

Dist.

No. 26

v. Pico,

Amendment by

457 U.S. 853

barring library

of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S.

of student

after she distributed

campus publication

allegedly containing indecent words was improper because it constituted the dissemination of ideas,

though perhaps not

in

good

taste).

Although the courts have recognized
appropriate in

some

that

for discipline is important,

where there

is

may be

narrowly tailored limitations on speech

cases, in the educational context these limited instances

tend be where the need

fear that the speech will interfere with the educational

mission (as with pre-college students), or where there are significant concerns that the speech

may

jeopardize public order and safety.

The

First

Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the

respecting an establishment of

freedom of speech, or of the press;

or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of

grievances." U.S. Const, amend.

I.

This amendment applies to the states under the

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
1 1

5.

Keyishian

v.

Bd of Regents, 385

e.g.,

Pico,

457 U.S.

at

855

Due

Process

n.l.

U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also Pickering

v.

Bd. of

a
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that publicly-funded universities could not expel students without affording them

some measure of due process 116
seizures.

or subject them to unreasonable searches and

117

These court decisions also reflected an emerging distinction between college
and university students on the one hand and younger students on the other
distinction not present at the time of Alice's error and the Tanton decision. The
Supreme Court explicitly recognized that college students are, generally
speaking, "young adults" and thus "less impressionable than younger students"
118
While holding on to the doctrine with regard to
and not in need of shielding.
young children, the courts jettisoned the in loco parentis doctrine as applied to
college and university students, replacing it instead with a vision of the
119
relationship based upon contract.
While these constitutional pronouncements related to publicly- funded
institutions, private institutions were not untouched by the revolution. In the
wake of campus crackdowns on student protests, the Carnegie Commission on
Higher Education published in 1971 a report and recommendations urging
colleges and universities, both private and public, to take steps to protect student
and faculty speech rights as essential to an academic community. 120 As a result,

—

educational institutions across the country adopted a statement of student rights,
which recognized for students at private institutions the same student freedoms
that

were

involving publicly funded ones.

at issue in litigation

Accrediting

agencies began to require similar institutional protections of academic freedom
and some form of due process for faculty and students before affixing their

Educ, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (upholding

Amendment free speech

First

right

of public high school

Cir.

1961) (requiring due

teacher to criticize school board and superintendent).
116.

£.g.,

Dixon

v.

Ala. State Bd. of

process in expulsion cases); Soglin

F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969);

v.

Buttony

cf.

Educ, 294 F.2d 150 (5th

Kauffman, 295
v.

117.

470 (App. 1967)
Morale

v.

978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), ajfd, 418

Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968) (rejecting

in loco parentis doctrine in university setting);

Rptr. 463,

F. Supp.

Goldberg

v.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal.

(also rejecting in loco parentis doctrine in university setting).

Grigel,

422

F.

Supp. 988, 997 (D. N.H. 1976) (regarding unauthorized and

involuntary search of student's dormitory room, the court held that "[a] college cannot,

and age, protect students under the aegis of in loco parentis authority from the
rules

and

laws, just as

it

cannot, under the

same

aegis, deprive students

of

rigors

in this

day

of society's

their constitutional

rights").

118.

Widmar v.

Vincent,

454 U.S. 263, 274 n. 1 4 ( 1 98 1 ). Widmar involved religious speech,

but the Court was rejecting the idea that

if

religious speech took place within the university,

students might misinterpret the message's content as in fact approved of by the university, and that
students needed to be protected from that misimpression.
119.

See, e.g.,

Bender

v.

Williamsport Area Sch.

("Unlike a university, where

it is

for the conduct of his or her

own

Dist.,

741 F.2d 538, 554 (3d Cir. 1984)

generally understood that a student
affairs, the

is,

with reason, responsible

behavior of a high school student

constant regulation and affirmative supervision of adult school authorities."),

is

subject to the

cert,

granted, 469

U.S. 1206 (1985), vacated, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
1

20.

See CARNEGIE COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUC, DISSENT AND DISRUPTION

(

1

97 1 ).

1
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121
Federal law also had an impact on public and private
stamps of approval.
colleges, as many were made vulnerable to federal laws affecting student rights
122
by virtue of their receipt of federally- funded student financial aid.
Ironically, institutions too played a key role in curbing the doctrine's
applicability to the larger student body. As they faced unprecedented litigation
over liability for student injuries, institutions themselves began to call for a
reduction of their responsibilities under the in locoparentis doctrine, particularly
in the area of tort law. Courts responded by rejecting tort claims by parents
alleging that institutions had breached a duty to monitor their children or others
who had harmed them. 123

121.

See,

Comm'n on

e.g.,

ACCREDITATION, Standard
publish and

Colls.,

5.4.3.3, at 61

Ass'n of Colls.

S.

(1996) [hereinafter

S.

&

Sch.,

Criteria for

Ass'n] (requiring institutions to

make available "a statement of student rights and responsibilities" and to outline clearly
W. ASS'N

the disciplinary procedures), available at www.sacscoc.org (Principles of Accreditation);

of Sch.

&

Handbook on Accreditation

Colls.,

W. Ass'n] (imposing

18, 127 [hereinafter

similar requirement), available at www.msache.org/pubs.html. Moreover, accrediting criteria also
anticipate a

community

Middle States Comm'n on Higher
Higher Education: Standards for

that tolerates free speech. See, e.g.,

Education, Characteristics of Excellence in
ACCREDITATION 4-6 (requiring "integrity in the institution's conduct of all

humane and

its

activities

through

equitable policies dealing with students, faculty, [and] staff and defining integrity as

presupposing academic freedom and

intellectual freedom"); S.

(requiring that faculty and students "be free to examine

all

ASS'N, supra, Standard 4.8.6,

at

50

pertinent data, question assumptions,

be guided by the evidence of scholarly research and teach and study the substance of a given

W. Ass'n,

discipline");

supra, at 18 (dictating that institution must publicly state

commitment

to

academic freedom).
122.

Grove City

See, e.g.,

Coll. v. Bell,

465 U.S. 555 (1984) (affirming lower court holding

that private educational institution that received

including

its

reached the
123.

athletic

programs, because

its

was

students received federal financial aid that eventually

where student driver became intoxicated

Alpha Phi Alpha

Fraternity,

(N.D.N. Y. Jan. 26, 1999) (finding university not
to control university sanctioned fraternity and
F.

Supp. 840 (D. Me.

1

at

campus picnic and

Supp. 286 (N.D.

W.

later

No. 96-CV-348, 97-CV-565, 1999
because

liable for pledge's injuries

no knowledge of

its

activities);

it

had car

WL

47153

had no duty

Albano

v.

Colby

993) (holding that college had no duty to prevent twenty-year-old

student from becoming intoxicated and causing harm to himself); Hartman
F.

subject to Title IX,

&?e,e.g.,Bradshawv. Rawlings,612F.2d 135(3dCir. 1979) (finding college not liable

accident); Lloyd v.

822

direct federal funding

institution).

to student passenger

Coll.,

no

Va. 1991) (stating that college had no duty under

in

v.

Bethany

Coll.,

778

loco parentis doctrine

and had not been negligent in case in which seventeen-year-old female student was attacked by two
male associates she met at a bar); Nero

v.

Kan. State Univ., 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993) (holding that

university-student relationship did not alone impose a duty to protect sexually assaulted student

from acts of fellow students or third parties, although landlord-tenant relationship could do
also Stamatakos, supra note 14, at 474; Robert D. Bickel,

Unique Relationship
Still,

to Postsecondary Education,

A

27 STETSON

the courts have recognized that colleges have

so);

see

Brief Comment About the Law's
L.

REV. 115, 115-16 (1997).

some obligation

to

provide a safe campus,

but again the activities in question are those that could cause actual physical harm, not simply moral

.

LAW REVIEW

INDIANA

882

Instead of the higher duty found in in loco parentis

welfare arm

—

[Vol. 35:851

—

the duty inherent in the
courts
found
instead
that
the
schools would be judged by ordinary

negligence standards. The courts rejected the doctrine even

in

cases

in

which the

was at issue was under the age of majority. 124
It has been argued that at least where student safety is concerned the doctrine has
125
However, these cases may reflect only a moderate
met with a recent revival.
student

whose behavior or

retreat;

it

doctrine

is

is

clear that in

safety

other areas

all

—except

—

of course

for athletics

the

essentially dead.

B.

Student-Athletes:

On

the Fringes

of the Revolution

campus

Student-athletes were often involved in the student-led

protests that

of rights for students and of civil rights in general.
Their efforts helped to end segregation in both athletic and nonathletic aspects
126
For many purposes, the athletic departments of
of college and university life.
colleges and universities continued to treat student-athletes the way they had
always treated them. Thus, while receiving benefits designed to make them
beholden to athletics, student-athletes did not gain all of the new, broader rights
that the revolution brought to other students, or gained them far more slowly.
Before considering the divergence of student-athlete rights from the larger
student body's rights, it is useful to consider the "why" of this phenomenon. The
led to the general expansion

reason for the divergence,

argue,

I

was

institutional bifurcation.

Reason Why Student-Athletes Did
Not Gain an Expansion of Rights

C. Institutional Bifurcation as the

The reason

that student-athletes did not gain the broad expansion

and 1970s

of rights

by that time,
of institutions and was
athletics had been separated out from the larger
Many educational institutions with
operating under its own set of rules.
intercollegiate athletic programs had become, in effect, bifurcated institutions.

that non-athlete students gained in the 1960s

is that,

life

behavior. See Hirshberg, supra note 14 (claiming a partial re-emergence of the in loco parentis
doctrine); see also Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll.,

question as to whether college had
cardiac arrest
responsibility

when engaging
is

also

embraced

No. 101-542, 204, 104

Stat.

989 F.2d 1360 (3d

1993) (finding jury

Cir.

proper safety precautions in place to aid student-athlete suffering

in athletics for
in the Student

which he was

recruited).

The notion of such

Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act, Pub. L.

2381, 2385-87 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092

(2000)).
1

24.

See, e.g. ,

not liable

215 (3d
its

Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234 (E.D.

when underage

Cir. 1993);

Pa.

1

992) (finding that college

student injured herself through alcohol self-indulgence), affd, 995 F.2d

Hartman, 778

F.

Supp.

at

294 ("A College does not stand

in

loco parentis to

seventeen year old college freshmen.").
1

25.

126.

See Hirshberg, supra note

1

4, at

This activism of black athletes

1

90-9 1

in particular

Edwards, The Revolt of the Black Athlete
Revolution

(1971).

has been chronicled.

(1969); see also

See, e.g.,

Harry

Jack Scott, The Athletic
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This trend began very early on when institutions hired professional coaches but
declined to integrate them into the faculty. Out of this environment emerged the
"training tables" where athletes dined separately from other students, as well as,
127
By the mid- 1900s it
on some campuses, separate living quarters for athletes.
institutions
not
to
include
athletics
income
and expenditures in
for
was common
the overall college or university budget reports, but rather to account for it
128
The need for such creative
separately and even privately to avoid scrutiny.
accounting grew greater as institutions strained under the pressure to expand their
129
athletic programs through new stadia that were beyond the institutions' means.
The financial strain on institutions was heightened by the effect of the Great
Depression in the 1930s and the military draft, which siphoned away many of the
ablest student-athletes for military service. Thus, in the 1 970s the Raiborn report
would conclude that contrary to the public image of athletics as a self-sustaining
institutional program, even one that made non-revenue programs possible, the
majority of institutions with athletic programs were operating their athletic
departments in the red due to rising coaches salaries and athletics program
13
costs. ° The passage of Title IX in the 1 970s added to this pressure. Under Title
IX, educational institutions receiving federal funds had to ensure gender equity
in men's and women's athletics programs. Not surprisingly, many educational
institutions resisted the application of Title IX to their athletic programs, then
predominantly serving males, although they conceded that other educational
131
In 1985, the NCAA passed a constitutional
programs were subject to it.

1

27.

1

forbidden

906

in the

1

AAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra

at

16 (training table done away with
In 1997, the

in

may soon

1

29.

among New England

were

73, at 8

colleges);

id. at

Missouri Valley Conference).

NCAA passed

CEO of the

See, e.g. ,

8- 1 9 (noting that training tables

lose appeal

Bylaws

6.2.1.

and 6.2.2 requiring that

budgets "be controlled by the institution and be subject

approved by the

1

IAAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note

Western and Ohio Conferences); 1907

(suggesting that training table concept

128.

note 63,

1996-97

institution.

to its"

department

athletic

normal budgeting procedures or be

NCAA Manual.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Convention of the NCAA

32 ( 1 934) [hereinafter 1 934 NCAA PROCEEDINGS]

(stating that

some schools

"financially embarrassed" because of efforts to maintain athletics

beyond

in Sixth District

their

means);

id.

were
at

42

(noting that Eighth District schools most frequently listed finances as major problem in athletics).
In 1928,

Brown

that its schools

University reported building a $750,000 gymnasium; the Third District reported

were "imitating" others

PROCEEDINGS, supra note 69,

in

"building stadia within their means." See

928 NCAA

at 18, 28.

Mitchell H. Raiborn, Revenues and Expenses of Intercollegiate Athletic

130.

Programs: Analysis of Trends and Relationships, 970-77
1

131.

1

See, e.g.,

Grove City

Coll. v. Bell,

(

1

978).

687 F.2d 684, 696-700 (3d

Cir. 1982) (noting that

educational institutions are treated as single entities under Title IX, including their athletic

programs, and citing congressional hearing testimony noting that objections to the inclusion of
athletics are directly against the spirit

U.S.

of Title IX),

cert,

granted, 459 U.S.

555 (1984); see also U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1688 (West 1999

itself

has been held to be not subject to Title IX.

Field:

The

NCAA Should Be Subject to

Title IX,

1

199 (1983),

& Supp. 2002).

So

Thomas M. Rowland, Level
1 SPORTS LAW. J. 143, 144 (2000).
E.g.,

aff'd,

far the

465

NCAA

the Playing

INDIANA
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requiring that athletic department budgets be controlled by the

and be subject to normal budgeting processes, 132 but years of special
treatment of athletics had already created a bifurcation of interests between the
athletic department on the one hand, and the rest of the institution on the other.
The failure of educational institutions either to embrace or reject
intercollegiate athletics as an academ ic endeavor created an environment that was
institution

ripe

for bifurcation.

contributed to

This writer believes that six additional factors also

it

—

The Insecure Career Status of Coaches. The battle between adherents
to the liberal arts tradition and those who favored practical training led to the
insecure and segregated status of coaches in institutions, which, in turn, helped
to make bifurcation possible. Any institutional allegiance that could have been
fostered among coaches was stymied, because not only did institutions generally
not offer coaches tenure, they fired coaches who failed to deliver a winning
record.
At the same time, institutions refused to reject coaching and
intercollegiate athletics outright. The precarious status of coaches forced those
with the primary responsibility for ensuring student welfare to consider their own
job security and, contrary to the in loco parentis doctrine, to choose actions
which increased that security through winning, even when such actions were
contrary to student welfare. Moreover, the insecure status of coaches encouraged
them to seek out avenues for promotion that were outside of the university
1.

structure.

—

The End ofGeneral Faculty Involvement in Athletics. At the first NCAA
meeting in 1906, the role of attendees was dominated by faculty not specializing
133
However, by the 1930s, presidents,
in athletics and general administrators.
administrators, and faculty in traditional disciplines had virtually disappeared,
134
replaced by those whose work was teaching and training in athletics.
The reduction of CEO and non-athletic faculty involvement and
specialization in coaching may have been inevitable given the growth of athletics
and, perhaps, was even a good thing if institutionally-run intercollegiate athletics
was to survive. Certainly, the emergence of professional associations among
135
But the
coaches helped to provide some standards, albeit voluntary ones.
mainstream
faculty
the
lack
of
security
of
athletics
distancing of
and
job
personnel also resulted in a conflict of interest because those with a direct
2.

1

See 1 988-89 NCAA Manual

32.

6.2.1 in the

IAAUS PROCEEDINGS,

delegates bear the
that time).

delegate,

134.

8.

This language was subsequently translated into Bylaw

1989-1990 manual.
1906

133.

1

title

In contrast,

is listed

supra note 63,

of "Professor," a

Alonzo Stagg,

as "Director" Stagg.

title

at

7-9 (displaying

list

of delegates; most

not given to coaches or athletics directors at

athletic director at the University

of Chicago and a

visiting

Id.

See also 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note

1

13, at

103 (lamenting the small number of

presidents and deans at the meetings).

135.

Early on, the conferences initiated annual coaches meetings.

Proceedings, supra note 66,
eliminating distrust

among

at 21,

coaches).

32

See,

e.g.,

1911

(referring to meetings regarding sportsmanship

and
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perpetuating intercollegiate athletics and in growing

financial

interest

programs

larger also had the primary responsibility for overseeing student-athlete

in

welfare.

and Media

Radio, Television,

3.

Attention.

—As noted

earlier, college

athletics generated enormous public attention from the earliest days of its arrival
136
In the 1950s, television completely rewrote the rules of
on campus.
intercollegiate athletics by contributing exponentially to its growth and moneymaking potential. Television allowed institutions to contract for coverage of
games and to offer events as advertising venues, available for a price. These
contributions created enormous difficulties for the alleged parent under the in
loco parentis doctrine. The NCAA awarded its first television contract to NBC
137
in 1952 for football coverage of member games for $1.1 million.
By the late
1990s, the NCAA was receiving more than eighty percent of its revenue from
television, and the schools and conferences with largest programs were receiving
138
a cut of that money through "revenue sharing."
The most recently negotiated
television network contract is an eleven-year, $6 billion agreement for NCAA
championship coverage and marketing beginning this year. 139 The televising of
sporting events also provided tremendous advertising for institutions themselves,
which theoretical ly increased their adm issions yields general ly The revenue that
athletics controlled, both in terms of profits, losses, and intangibles, made
.

wagged the institutional dog.
The Ceding of Power over Athletics to National and Regional Bodies.

athletics the tail that
4.

—

NCAA and conference control also created an environment ripe
bifurcation. As the NCAA and conferences began to create specialized

Ironically, the
for

legislation, the institutions

began to surrender the right to affect athletics through

internal policies.

This separation of governance had a significant impact upon student-athletes'
be heard in the bodies that affected their lives. Because traditional
campus committees no longer dealt with intercollegiate athletics, students had no
on-campus representation. Also, because students were not members of the
NCAA, and for a substantial period of time there was no representative body
within the NCAA charged with ensuring that student-athlete concerns and
interests were protected, students essentially had no representation within that
body. Indeed, student representation within the NCAA did not come until 1989
through a non-voting Student-athlete Advisory Committee ("SAAC") selected by
NCAA members. Moreover, it was not until the late 1990s that the NCAA
required both campus and conference SAACs. After NCAA restructuring in
1996, a national SAAC was scrapped in favor of three separate divisional ones,
which reduced the ability of student-athletes to band together to affect those
right to

1

36.

See discussion supra Part

1

37.

Falla, supra note

138.
1

6,

39.

1999,

5, at

See Carter, supra note
Id. at

at 1).

23 (citing

I.D.

106. General

4, at

23-24.

NCAA CBS Reach
,

Motors was a corporate sponsor.

1

1-Year 6 Billion Agreement,

NCAA News,

Dec.
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140

The Marginal Societal Status ofMany Student-Athletes and Their Natural
Another fact that facilitated bifurcation was that those participants
Supporters.
subject to the rules were the students least able to contest them. It could be
argued that by focusing early concerns on preparatory schools, colleges and
universities discouraged students from economically stable backgrounds from
141
Racial minorities suffered a double dose of
participation in sports.
discrimination as racial discrimination also created economic disadvantages
regardless of background. By the 1 990s black students would make up more than
sixty percent of all male Division I basketball players and twenty-two percent of
142
all scholarship athletes at predominantly- white institutions.
In addition,
throughout the 1990s, black males, consistently made up more than twenty-five
percent of all Division I male student-athletes, including those in nonrevenue
143
These figures held true even though black males and,
producing sports.
indeed, blacks in general, made up far less of these institutions' entire student
5.

—

population, athletics

staff,

or faculty.

144

Discrimination and disadvantage also affected the natural advocates for these

—

and leaders in their communities. Rightly or not,
facing discrimination in other areas of employment and education, many blacks
came to see athletics as one of the few available avenues for education and
economic advancement.
These facts also explain why very few student-athletes brought lawsuits
against their schools and why those who did were largely unsuccessful,
particularly when the institutions began to mobilize their own legal resources to
marginal groups

their parents

33-35.

140.

Id. at

141.

See discussion supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discouraging preparatory

school recruitment).
1

68

(1

A Question of Ethics, MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 357, 367the impact of racism in college sports, see RACISM IN

Paul Anderson, Racism in Sports:

42.

For various

996).

articles assessing

College Athletics (Dana Brooks & Ronald Althouse
143.

Chart,

Student-Athlete

Unfortunately, this latest chart

by Race,

Participation

1993) and Davis, supra note 58.

NCAA

NEWS,

Jan.

15,

2001.

does not provide separate figures for the high-yield/high expense

sports of mens' football and basketball. Black
as disproportionate as black

eds.

women's

male representation

in

participation in

male

athletics.

womens'

Id. It is

athletics is not

clear that males, not

females, were the group whose athletic talents were exploited in the early search for athletic dollars.

By

contrast,

women were

denied the opportunity to compete at

many

implementation of Title IX. The reduced professional opportunities
a shorter projected lifespan for

women's

in

institutions

womens"

up

until the

sport and possibly

professional careers due to perceived family obligations

may also explain why black women are not as significantly overrepresented as black men, although
they do show some overrepresentation.
1

The point

44.

is

an obvious one but

statistics also

support

it.

Anderson, supra note 1 42,

at

367-68 (noting that only ten percent of all athletic positions were filled by African-Americans from
1991-94; that African- Americans are only 3.6% of college athletic directors; 4.9% of associate
athletic directors; fourteen percent of Division

Division

I

colleges).

I

head coaches; and six percent of all students

at
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defend such

145

At

suits.

the

same

887

time, the marginal situation of these athletes,

including the discrimination they faced, may have added to the view that studentathletes were incapable of making decisions for themselves and therefore must
be paternalistically treated or that they were somehow undeserving of or could
not handle the freedoms assured to non-athlete students.

146

D. The Results of Institutional Bifurcation

The

of bifurcation was, ultimately, an inability of colleges and
universities to control their intercollegiate athletic programs and an inability to
adhere to the much-heralded principles of amateurism. Intercollegiate sports
essentially became a lucrative and expensive professional training arm for
educational institutions. This lack of control manifested itself in numerous ways.
7.
Proliferation of Practices and Postseason Games. Among these
manifestations were a proliferation of post-season games and a lengthening of
practice times. By the 1 940s, many of the modern "bowl" games that now
pepper school "vacation" times and holidays were well established. These games
147
To study the proliferation
occurred during student vacations or holiday times.
148
"Bowl
Games
the
NCAA
created
a
Committee"
in 1 947.
Bowl
of bowl games,
games threatened the pure amateur model because they increased the amount of
time spent on sport, emphasized commercialism, and often took place at venues
and under conditions outside of the institution's control. The overwhelming
number of the bowls were sponsored by noncollegiate institutions, usually
149
business groups or chambers of commerce that desired to attract business.
result

—

145.

The NCAA

contact with those
146.
1

47.

set

who

up a satellite

office in Washington, D.C., in

See

NCAA,

947 NCAA YEARBOOK 1 83

1

167; see also, e.g.,

founded and expressing happiness

id.

that

at

167-74.

The

list

[hereinafter

1

100-01 (noting alarm

NCAA

That committee's 1949 report identified some
id. at

996

in order to

be in close

See Davis, supra note 58.

NCAA Yearbook

also

1

could affect athletics policy. See Carter, supra note 4, at 24-25.

947 Yearbook];
at large

NCAA,

1

948

number of Bowls being

has determined to regulate postseason football).

fifty

included bowls well

bowls that had taken place

known

to

modem

recent years. See

in

day football fans, such as the

Cotton Bowl, East-West (Shrine) Bowl, Rose Bowl, Sugar Bowl, and Sun Bowl. Likewise,

it

included names not as recognizable today, including the Junior Rose Bowl, Glass Bowl, Raisin

Bowl, and Burley Bowl.
mailed by the committee

knowledge of the

Id. at

168.

While only seventeen of these responded to a questionnaire

to their sponsor's anticipated address, the

structure

committee gleaned some basic

of bowls or lack thereof from that information. See

id. at

168-69. All

of the bowls were postseason events.

Such

reports on

bowl games continued

to

YEARBOOK 259 (noting ten postseason "bowl" events "for the
Extra Events Committee":

Orange (Jan. 2,
Sugar (Jan
1

48.

!49.

1

2, 1956),
1

Com

956), Prairie

2,

1

(Nov. 24, 1955), Cotton (Jan.

View (Jan. 2,

Sun (Jan

NCAA
955 season were certified by NCAA

be offered. See,

1

e.g.,

NCAA,

2, 1956),

956), Refrigerator (Dec. 4,

1

1955-56

Gator (Dec. 31, 1955),

955),

Rose (Jan.

2,

1

956),

1956), and Tangerine (Jan. 2, 1956)).

947 YEARBOOK, supra note 1 47.

Though not controlled by

collegiate institutions directly,

many of these bowls reported

1
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However,

institutions received

compensation for
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their teams' participation in

these events, often in the form of a substantial portion of the gate receipts. 150

A

few bowls, among them the Rose Bowl and Cotton Bowl, were sponsored by the
competing institutions themselves or their conferences. 151 Traveling distances
to games also increased as intercollegiate athletics expanded from a regional to
the national scope. Even before the arrival of the airplane, under institutional
control, students traveled hundreds of miles and missed days or weeks of
classes.

152

The bifurcation of institutions into athletic and nonathletic venues lessened
their power to control these inroads into student-athlete time. Of course, as the
financial incentives of such events increased, the willingness of institutions to

control bowl

game

seemed

proliferation

was

also tested, particularly

when

other

be taking advantage of such games.
2. The Distancing of the Intercollegiate Athletics Coach.
Another result
of bifurcation was the growing separation between the intercollegiate athletics
coach and his or her school. It would not be until 1955 that the NCAA secured
a national regulation to require inter alia that coaches be given the same career
advancement rights and security as others hired to the faculty. However, it would
be longer before a majority of schools actually took action to make this
153
happen.
Successful coaches thus became easy targets for those who would offer
compensation and incentives from sources outside the institution's regular
budgetary structure. During the 1980s, the avenues for outside supplementation
of coaches' salary took a dramatic turn. The Nike Corporation altered the face
of coaches compensation by initiating lucrative contracts that compensated
coaches for requiring their student-athletes to wear the manufacturer's apparel
institutions

to

—

distributing a substantial portion of their receipts to participating institutions.
1

50.

1

948 NCAA YEARBOOK, supra note

1

47, at

1

69.

Today

football

bowl games remain

lucrative.

151.
Id.

at

1

70.

The "Glass Bowl" was also in this group of institutionally-sponsored post-season games.
The committee concluded

that the

NCAA

should take some action "to control

member institutions in the acceptance of bowl game bids" given the bowls'
Id.

its

post-season character.

at 171.
1

52.

In 1928, the

NCAA's

their contests against eastern

Eighth

District,

comprised largely of western schools, defended

and midwestern schools, complaining

when teams from

that

northwest and southwest travel 1400 to 1700 miles in competition, there

is

the

no contact. While

noting the increase in such contests, the reporter stated that it was inevitable that the airplane would

soon be used to transport teams, thus resolving the problem of missed

Proceedings, supra note 69,
153.

See

1

at

classes.

See 1928

NCAA

45-46.

955-56 NCAA YEARBOOK, supra note

1

47, at 36. There

it

was

detailed that

[a]n institution should enter into a contractual agreement with a coach similar to those

entered into with other

members of the

faculty

and such a contract should include the

assignment of faculty rank, benefits of tenure and retirement and such other rights and
privileges as are enjoyed
Id.

by other members of the contracting

institution's faculty.
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or for otherwise promoting the manufacturer's products.

154

889

Today such contracts

common element of coaches'

compensation packages.
Scholarly
and Research-Oriented Approach to the
Failure
a
The
3.
of
Resolution of Issues Relating to Athletics and Education. Those looking at
early NCAA proceedings may be surprised to see the number of formal papers
that were presented. This approach to the convention was surrendered once
athletic specialists began to take over the proceedings and once television came
into the horizon. Later proceedings took the form of simple discussions focusing
upon new rulemaking, with very few prepared remarks. Perhaps this evolution
was necessary given the evolving nature of the NCAA's business. As it moved
from an organization which simply talked about policy to one that actually
implemented and enforced it, participants likely had little time for pipedreams.
But the tradeoff was that those who had the time and mission to write and think
about the relationship between athletics policy and the larger world, did not
spend their research energies on that topic. Thus, generally speaking, athletics,
both inside and outside of the university, did not benefit from the broader
155
contributions generated in the research arms of universities.
are a

—

E.

Outside Pressures Lead to Increasing Controls

Noting the proliferation of post-season events and what they perceived as
abuses in intercollegiate athletics, commentators outside of the NCAA chastened
schools to take "control" of their athletic programs. The press had constantly
criticized institutional administration of intercollegiate sports, even as they
156
Among
helped to perpetuate many of the problems of which they complained.
academic types, the "faculty control," and later "presidential control" banners
began to wave furiously, advocating greater control over athletics. In 1929, the
Savage report by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
argued that "[t]he defense of the intellectual integrity of the college and of the
157
university lies with the president and faculty."
In the 1950s, the American

Sonny Vaccaro, a former Nike employee and

154.

The

entering into these types of contracts with coaches.

common

"gentlemens' agreements" eventually became

compensation package. See,

e.g., Bill

School Basketball, WASH. POST, Feb.
and college coaches);

Bill

1

7,

in

contracts that originally began as

the industry as a part of a coach's

Brubaker, The Most Influential

8,

1988, at

C5

Man

in the

World of High

(noting Vaccaro's "open line" to high school

Brubaker, Sonny Vaccaro Peddling Shoe, Influence in Basketball

Circles, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1988, at 2;

Mar.

sports agent, initiated the practice of

Mike

Stanton,

No

Business, Like Shoe Biz,

NEWSDAY,

1989, at 99.

55.

W.

Burlette Carter, Introduction:

What Makes a "Field" a Field?,

1

Va.

J.

SPORTS

Law 235, 236 (2000).
1

56.

See supra note 86 and accompanying

1

57.

Savage, supra note

With

[the president

and

5, at xxi.

The

text.

faculty] also lies the authority.

the university has always been in their hands.
their

went on:

report

power the decision touching matters

.

.

.

The educational governance of

The president and

faculty

have

affecting the educational policy

in

and

&

..

1

.

INDIANA

890

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:85

Council on Education issued the first of many reports that called for control over
158
In addition, in the 1990s, the Knight Commission on
athletics programs.
Intercollegiate Athletics took the lead and urged the NCAA to exercise control. ,59
Eventually, the NCAA heard and responded to calls for increased control.
In 1952, the central NCAA finally entered the business of enforcing rules against
members, creating the first infractions committee. 160 The NCAA attempted to
161
quell the rising tide of post-season games.
The NCAA also passed legislation
to prevent students from participating in non-collegiate sponsored events without
162
prior permission.
Further, the NCAA passed legislation requiring a coach to
include any supplementary income in his/her contracts and requiring the
163
institution to enforce these contracts.
The NCAA also passed academic
164
integrity legislation setting minimum academic standards for student-athletes.
Even as the NCAA became more and more involved with the perpetuation
and enforcement of national standards, athletics became more lucrative and
expensive for the participants.
The stakes of winning grew higher for
institutions. The growth in the complexity of athletics is obvious from the
growth of NCAA documentation. The first volume of NCAA proceedings
totaled thirty-seven pages, including the convention reports, constitution and
165
bylaws.
By 1996, when the NCAA underwent a dramatic restructuring, the

intellectual interests

of their

institution.

If

commercialized athletics do not affect the

educational quality of an institution nothing does.
into a sincere relation to the intellectual life

The responsibility

of the college

to bring athletics

rests squarely

on the

shoulders of the president and faculty.
xx-xxi.

Id. at
1

See Carter, supra note

58.

See

159.
1

id.

4, at

4 1 -44.

45-48.

at

A constitutional compliance committee, was the first such attempt, but punitive action

60.

for violations required a supporting vote of the

The NCAA

membership. That committee was

1955-56

NCAA

YEARBOOK, supra

NCAA,

note 147,

NCAA Yearbook

1953
at

enforcement and 1952 creation of infractions committee).

NCAA Yearbook,

243; see also

159 (reporting history of
In 1956-1957 the

established public, written committee procedures for the infractions committee.

39

disbanded.

reentered legislation enforcement in 1952 with an infractions committee, apparently a

subcommittee of the membership committee. See

NCAA,

later

Appendix (Recommended Policies and Practices for

NCAA

NCAA

Council

NCAA,

1956-57

Intercollegiate Athletics)

(setting forth "official" procedures).

A "Principle Governing Post-season Games" first appears in the constitution adopted

161
at the

1954 proceedings.

The

162.

"Principle Governing Competition in Post-season [sic] and Non-Collegiate

Sponsored Contests"

conform
1

to

63.

164.
1

65

1

95 1 constitution.

required that such competition

1

1

in

It

NCAA rules. NCAA, 1950 NCAA YEARBOOK 254.
See NCAA, 955-56 NCAA YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at 36 (providing that "special

concessions to a coach

binding

appeared in the

first

the same

The most
See

1

906

.

.

.

should be set forth

manner
well
1

in detail in the contract

as the other provisions

and accepted as

legal

of the contractual agreement").

known of these efforts was

proposition 48 and proposition 16.

AAUS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63

and

1
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89

166

proceedings and the manual (separately bound) were nearly 600 pages each.
This movement toward greater central control between the 1950s and the
1990s was not without its hitches. In the 1 970s, some institutions, believing that
the NCAA had gone too far in investigating infractions on their campuses, sought
167
168
Others filed lawsuits against the NCAA.
the assistance of Congress.
During this period as well, competitive parity became a central focus of
enforcement and legislative efforts. The result was not always fair for the
student-athlete for the association's focus shifted from concern on educational
matters to ensuring competitive athletic equity among NCAA institutional
members. Parity principles required that an offending institution be punished in
such a way as to restore competitive equity to others who did not have the same
advantage, even if that punishment meant that an innocent group of studentathletes might suffer. For example, if an institution were found to be in violation
regulations, those athletes involved in the violation, or the entire team,
of
whether or not those athletes were at fault, could be declared ineligible. 169 At the
same time, the NCAA transfer rules prohibited those same innocent athletes from
170
transferring to other non-offending schools and playing immediately there.
Parity principles and commercial concerns ensured that institutions would not act
to better the lives of their charges if so acting would affect the delicate balance
among the institutions or the commercial investment in the athlete. 171 And

NCAA

NCAA

166.

Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1996 Convention Proceedings; 1996-97NCAA

Manual, supra
167.

note 128.

NCAA

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and

Enforcement Program:

Investigations for the

House Comm. on

Interstate

and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.

(1978).
168.

See, e.g.,

NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (rejecting the NCAA's attempt

to regulate televising of member football games in the
1

34 F.3d 1010 (10th

Cir.

name of competitive parity); Law v. NCAA,

1998) (challenging attempts to regulate coaching salaries

in

the

name of

parity).
1

69.

1

989-90 NCAA

Manual 267-7

1

[hereinafter

penalties for secondary and major infractions).

A

1

989-90 NCAA Manual]

secondary infraction

(setting forth

was defined as one

that

provided only a limited recruiting or competitive advantage and that was isolated or inadvertent

in

nature. Id. at 265-66.
1

70.

Id. at 1

1

9.

Transfer rules date back to the

first

NCAA rules adopted in

1

906. See supra

notes 106-08 and accompanying text (rule requiring one-year residence before transfers could
participate).

171.

Although concerns of competitive parity were always present, the parity principle was

formally stated in the 1989-90 manual through the "Principle of Competitive Equity" as follows:

"The

structure

and programs of the Association and the

activities

of

its

members

shall

promote

opportunity for equity in competition to assure that individual student-athletes and institutions will

not be prevented unfairly from achieving the benefits inherent
athletics."

1989-90 NCAA Manual, supra note 169,

NCAA Manual 5 (same language).

In his

1995

in participation in intercollegiate

NCAA 2001-02 Division
State of the Association Address, NCAA CEO
at 4.

Compare

I

Cedric Dempsey acknowledged that the focus upon the parity principle had led some to believe that
competition mattered more than the rights and needs of student athletes. Cedric Dempsey, State

1
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although courts pulled back on their embrace of in loco parentis where the
ordinary student body was concerned, they seemed to give the institutions free
reign to

manage

athletics

when

student-athletes

Declaring that participation

found

in athletics

were

was

of participation by a public

that the denial

violation of any constitutional right.

172

a.

at issue.

privilege, not a right, courts

institution did not

amount to a

This characterization was particularly

ironic because outside of student athletics, by the late 1960s, the right/privilege
distinction in constitutional law

was reportedly meeting

its

demise.

173

In

more

recent years, at least one court has suggested that athletics "eligibility" rules are
subject to greater deference than other types of
rules such as those

NCAA

affecting institutional rights.

rooted

The

basis for such a conclusion

the idea that the perpetuation of amateur athletics has

in

status or an archaic view
It is

174

of student

seems

some

be

to

sacred

rights.

true that as controls over student-athletes increased,

many of them

gained the right to receive substantial athletic scholarships. However, not

all

student-athletes subject to controls received scholarships or full scholarships.

As

I

discuss below, the legal validity of a "rights for scholarship" tradeoff

questionable
tradeoff

when publicly-funded

institutions are involved.

was arguably an inappropriate proposal

175

is

Moreover, the

for institutions purportedly

concerned about education and wielding such tremendous power.
In the end, however one views the situation, movements that transformed
student rights in other parts of educational institutions did not cut so deeply into
athletic programs. I contend that this period of institutional bifurcation and

saw

athletics isolation

of the control
welfare

of

leg

in intercollegiate athletics

in

loco parentis and a corresponding weakening of the

leg.

As might be expected
began

to

with such a diverse group, over time the allegiance

requiring different

splinter,

of the Association Address, 1995
1

1

See Carter, supra note

72.

995 U.S.

Dist. Lexis

321

1

4, at

72

(citing

different

groups.

176

Graham

v.

Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n,

Dist.

47J

v.

Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (rejecting a Fourth

challenge to drug testing for public school athletes, holding that participants in

have should expect reasonable intrusions upon

that student-athletes

were leaders

could lead to athletics

See, e.g., William

See, e.g.,

in the local

their rights

and privileges and that manner

the court also noted that the testing followed findings

drug culture and

institutional

concern that drug abuse

injuries.

Constitutional Law, 81
174.

for

(E.D. Tenn 1995) and Karmanos v. Baker, 617 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D.

of testing was not unreasonable). However,

173.

legislation

NCAA PROCEEDINGS 74-75.

Mich. 1985); see also Veronia School

Amendment
athletics

administration a reinforcement

W. Van

Alstyne, The Demise

of the Right- Privilege Distinction

Harv.L.Rev. 1439 (1968) (arguing that demise taking place in the

Smith

"eligibility" rules are not

v.

NCAA,

in

1960s).

139 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1998) (opining that

commercial and thus are not subject to

antitrust challenge), cert, granted,

524 U.S. 982 (1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). For a questioning of this
blanket view case, see Carter, supra note 4,
175.
1

76.

See discussion infra Part
See Carter, supra note

at

75-77.

III.B.

4, at

27-38 (discussing restructuring). As early as the

1

950s, the

1
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Ultimately, the

893

NCAA divided into three different "divisions" representing clear

and financial differences in their approach to athletics. Division I
schools comprised institutions with the largest athletic programs and the most
to gain from television revenues. They embraced the concept of both athletic
scholarships and wide media coverage and imposed the greatest restrictions on
177
Division II schools were smaller schools that offered athletic
student-athletes.
178
Division III schools were
scholarships, but placed less emphasis on athletics.
political

those that rejected the notion that athletics should be uniquely considered in
179
Then, in 1996 and 1997, the
passed dramatic
awarding a scholarship.

NCAA
restructuring legislation. As a result, the three NCAA divisions,
II, and III,
each went their own ways legislatively and a single NCAA Manual became three
I,

180

Division I schools began to handle most of their legislative business
manuals.
outside of the convention context; thus, the size of the proceedings decreased
because there was less that was publicly available to report, but certainly the
amount of business done dramatically increased. 181 Each of these divisions
would continue to assert adherence to the principle of amateurism, but each
defined amateurism in its own way. Thus, as the NCAA entered the year 2000,
it reversed its trend toward strong central governance.
While the form of governance has changed dramatically, the absolute control
exercised by the Divisions, particularly Division I, over student-athletes' lives
has not.
This writer sees three troubling trends that characterize NCAA legislation
under the perversion of in loco parentis. First, the central regulatory structure
rarely considered the student anything but athlete first. Any other rights the
student had outside of the athletic context were subrogated or merged into athlete
rights. Second, as the central regulatory structure grew more complex, the rules
were commonly interpreted to assume that action not permitted under
rules was forbidden until an exception was granted. Lastly, even after the clear
death of traditional in loco parentis, student-athletes' interests were recognized
only to the extent that they converged with institutional rights. In the case of a
conflict, the student-athlete always lost. The next section examines these trends.

NCAA

smaller colleges held separate "roundtable" meetings at the annual convention. See.,

1949 Yearbook
of this group.
177.

101-65.

at

Id. at

NCAA,

e.g.,

NCAA,

A separate NCAA small college committee also reflected the interests

230.

2000-01 Division

I

Manual,

at

321-38 [hereinafter 2000-01 Division

I

Manual].
1

78.

1

79.

NCAA, 2000-01 DIVISION II NCAA MANUAL, at 267-79.
See, e.g. NCAA, 200 -02 DIVISION
NCAA MANUAL, at 227-3 7 [hereinafter 2000-0
See

Division III Manual]
that student-athletes
in

(setting forth divisional

meet the same

order to receive financial
1

80.

181.

at 64.

membership requirements) and 107-08 (requiring

institutional regulations applicable to the general student

aid).

See Carter, supra note

Id

111

1

,

4, at

35-36.

body

1

.
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Control, Welfare, and Deference Today

have argued so

of control exercised over
one must appreciate the role of the in

far that to understand the degree

student-athletes in intercollegiate athletics,

loco parentis doctrine.

I

have attempted

to illustrate that the doctrine provided

the legal and social basis for institutions to exercise broad controls over the lives

of student-athletes in the name of protecting their welfare. I have further
attempted to show that although the doctrine met its demise in the 1960s and
1970s, it remained a force in intercollegiate athletics administration. A distorted
version of that doctrine emerged, one that emphasized control and deemphasized
welfare. Below are two examples of how this altered in loco parentis doctrine
continues to be manifested in contemporary intercollegiate athletics policy.
A. Student Free Speech Rights

996, Sports Illustrated invited a student-athlete to write for the magazine
after the magazine discovered the student's work on his own website. The
In

1

him permission to write the article on the grounds
amateurism principle. The school reasoned
that the student-athlete's writing would be used (either directly or indirectly) to
promote the magazine and, therefore, Sports Illustrated would be exploiting his
student-athlete's school denied

that

would

it

violate the

athletic ability.

The

NCAA's

182

NCAA rule was Bylaw

which prohibited a studentathlete from using his or her name or picture to directly advertise or promote the
183
sale or use of commercial products or services.
NCAA regulations did permit
uncompensated and nonpromotional radio and TV appearances (with
relevant

12.5.2.1,

restrictions), but the rules said nothing about writing.

194

concluded that because the activity was not permitted,

it

was

student did not write the column or challenge either the

NCAA or his school

court.

The

interpreters

prohibited.

The
in

185

Concerned about the irony of educational institutions preventing students
from taking advantage of such experiences, some institutions led an effort to
amend the rules to expand student writing opportunities. 186 However, as a result
of a vote to restructure the NCAA at the 1 996 and 1 997 conventions, each of the
three NCAA divisions had the right to develop its own rules regarding student
writing opportunities. The differences in the legislative approaches that emerged

among

conflicts

1

1

how

the divisions illustrate

82

996, at 4.

of interest that make

it

institutional financial considerations create

difficult for institutions to give student-athletes

NCAA News, Mar. 25,
Students were permitted to publish in the NCAA News, the official NCAA newspaper.

See Greg Belinfanti, Athletes Need a Way to Get the Word Out,

Thus, Belinfanti, a different student, wrote an opinion piece challenging the outcome.

1

183.

1996-97

184.

See

id.

NCAA Manual, supra note

128, at 105-06.

at 106.

1

85.

See Belinfanti, supra note

1

1

86.

The

amendments came up

997

original proposals for

82.

NCAA Convention Proceedings A

1

25-A 1 27

at the

[hereinafter

1997 convention. See
1

NCAA,

997 NCAA Proceedings].

.
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their full due. In other words, the Sports Illustrated cast

flowed from

demonstrate the perversion of

it

in

and the

895

legislation that

loco parentis that

now

guides

intercollegiate athletics regulatory policy.

Significantly, the Sports Illustrated matter raised the rights of all student-

As noted
above, the then-existing rule allowed uncompensated and unpromotional radio
187
It said nothing about writing opportunities.
and television appearances only.
Perhaps the reason for the silence was because the drafters didn't think of the
possibility that student-athletes would wish to write in this manner. It seems that
regulators were only thinking of the student-athlete as an athlete playing for a
team, and the key media for athletes in that role were sports radio and television.
Such broad legislation also probably resulted from the assumption that the
and institutions had the power to broadly circumscribe student conduct
in the name of athletics, as institutions had so for so long under the in loco
parentis doctrine.
How then did each division resolve the Sports Illustrated dilemma? In short,
those divisions with larger financial investments in athletics granted fewer rights;
those with a smaller investment granted greater rights. Thus, Division III, which
tends to have significantly smaller athletic programs, does not depend on
athletics for income and does not offer athletically based scholarships, imposed
athletes to

communicate

in

various media, not just the rights of one.

NCAA

no

on

restrictions

season.

media

1

It

student-athletes writing, either during season or out

its

declared that Division

students

III

activities, including those for

may

participate at

compensation.

any time

in all

188

See 1 996-97 NCAA Manual, supra note 1 28, at 1 05-06 (generally prohibiting students

87.

from receiving pay for

athletic ability

and from engaging

Radio and Television Appearances.
television

is

related in

any way to

If

in

promotion). Section 12.5.3 stated:

a student-athlete's appearance on radio or

athletics ability or prestige, the student-athlete shall

not receive any remuneration for that appearance; nor shall the student-athlete make any
endorsement, expressed or implied, of any commercial product or service. The studentathlete

may, however, receive legitimate and normal expenses directly related to such

an appearance, provided

it

campus. The

may

institution

occurs within a 30-mile radius of the institution's main

provide such expenses for such an appearance in the

general locale of an institution's away-from-home competition.

NCAA,

188.

12.5.3

1997-98

Media

—Division

III.

A

student-athlete

appearance on radio, television,

participate in writing projects)
related in

.

.

NCAA Division III Manual 67 (1998).

Activities

activities (e.g.,

is

when

any way to athletics

in films

may

participate in

media

or stage productions, or

the student-athlete's appearance or participation

ability or prestige.

A

student-athlete

may

receive

legitimate and normal expenses directly related to such an appearance or participation.

The

student-athlete

compensation
services.

at

may engage

in

such

activities at

any time and may receive

a rate commensurate with the going rate

Further, the student-athlete's

in that locale for

name may be used

similar

to advertise his or her

participation in such activity, provided the student-athlete's status as a student-athlete
is

Id

of

not used for promotional purposes.

1

.
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followed a single approach. They divided
student rights into two categories: ( 1 ) those "During the Playing Season" and (2)
189
First, during the season, a student-athlete
those "Outside the Playing Season."
contrast, Divisions

I

and

II

can appear on radio or television programs or engage in writing projects at any
time, so long as the student's participation was uncompensated and the student
190
The language adopted
is not "promoting a commercial product or service."
191
permits
coaches
expressly
to have students appear on their television shows,
an express assurance not previously in the rules. Of course, while this new rule
allowed "writing" during the season, it said nothing about appearances in film
and stage productions during the season, even those held on campus. 192 Given
the focus on the various types of media appearances in the rules, and the mention
of film and stage in the off-season provision, this omission was no accident. 193
These two divisions took a slightly different view as to student expression
when the playing season was over. After the season, student-athletes may appear
on radio and television shows, and may also appear in film and stage productions
on an uncompensated and nonpromotional basis. As a caveat, however, the
student must be in good academic standing in order to take advantage of these

new

1

"privileges."

89.

1

194

997 NCAA PROCEEDINGS, supra note

190.

Id.

191.

Id. at

A-125.

192.

Id

A-125

93

See

1

at

NCAA,

to
1

1

86, at

A- 1 25

to

A- 1 26.

A- 126.

997-98

NCAA DIVISION Manual 81(1 998).
I

(a)

During the Playing Season. During the playing season, a student-athlete may appear

on

local radio

projects

and television programs

when the

athletics ability

coaches shows) or engage

(e.g.,

student-athlete's appearance or participation

related in

any way

to

or prestige, provided the student-athlete does not receive any

remuneration for the appearance or participation
shall not

is

in writing

make any endorsement,

in the activity.

The

student-athlete

express or implied, of any commercial product or

service.
Id.

(emphasis added). The provision also permitted the student-athlete to "receive legitimate and

normal expenses directly related to the appearance."
it

Id.

Thus, this provision aided schools because

permitted schools or coaches to finance such appearances

when

they were

made on

the school's

behalf or on the coaches' shows, without violating financial aid rules. See generally infra Part HI.B
(discussion of financial aid rules).

194.
(b) Outside the Playing Season.
participate in

media

activities (e.g.,

productions or participation
is related in

Outside the playing season, a student-athlete

any way

appearance on radio, television,

in films

may

or stage

in writing projects) when such appearance or participation

to athletics ability or prestige, provided the student-athlete

is

eligible academically to represent the institution and does not receive any remuneration

for such appearance or participation.

The student-athlete may not make any

endorsement, expressed or implied, of any commercial product or service.
1

997-98 NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 1 93,

provision mentions stage productions while the

first

at

8 1 (emphasis added). Note that the second

does

not.
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Members of the

897

("SAAC") and

Student- Athlete Advisory Committee

their

urged support of these changes, arguing that studentfrom existing restrictions in order to have a broad
educational experience and that student-athletes should be treated as other
institutional supporters

athletes need some

relief

students on these matters.

195

But indeed, these provisions do not

treat student-

athletes like other students.

belong to the NCAA,
not once in the discussions at the convention did anyone mention the First
Amendment or "free speech." No one seemed to realize, or seemed willing to
say not even the student representatives that "rights" might actually be at
196
No one surmised that academically
issue, rather than mere privileges.
/^eligible students may be the ones most interested in speaking about athletic
issues, yet, in Divisions I and II, they are barred from doing so without express
permission in the offseason. Perhaps substantial discussions took place at the
NCAA Council, which in fact sponsored the legislation, but the outcome does not
197
With respect to all three pieces of legislation, the NCAA's 1997
suggest it.
convention notes stated that the proposals were "designed specifically as a
student-athlete welfare issue" and were "a step toward enhancing the studentathlete's overall experience, thereby encouraging more student-athletes to take
full advantage of the educational opportunities related to participation in
,98
Certainly, broader rights than those related to
intercollegiate competition ."
Indeed, although

many publicly-supported

institutions

—

—

participation in intercollegiate athletics

The now defunct

were

at issue.

in loco parentis doctrine certainly offers support to the

approaches of Divisions I and II. One argument is that the legislation uses media
and other appearances as "carrots" to ensure that students keep up their grades.
Another is that the rules during the playing season represent an assessment by the
institution that students simply cannot judge for themselves how much time plays
and productions will take. Finally, it can be argued that the legislation protects

NCAA,

195.

1997 NCAA Convention Proceedings, supra note 186,

at

A- 126

to

A- 127.

The statement added that "in the spirit of federation, each division has proposed standards regarding
a student-athlete's participation in media-related activities that
division." Id. at
1

believes

is

appropriate for that

A- 127.

Later, the

96.

[the 1997]

it

SAAC members called the legislation "the most far-reaching change made at

Convention" and stated that "[ujnder the new regulation, student-athletes are free to

express themselves both as students and as athletes, without endangering their eligibility." Karrie
Farrell et

al.,

Student-Athlete View

News, Jan. 27,

—Convention Listended

SAAC

athletes this opportunity."

97.

198.

The 1995-96 annual

NCAA Communications Committee requested input from

SAAC

agreed that student-athletes should be permitted to write for

commercial publications" and "agreed to support a

1

NCAA

regarding student-athletes' right to write for commercial publications," and that after

discussing the issue, "the

Report

Concerns of Athletes,

1997, http://www.ncaa.org/news/1997/970127/comment.html.

report for that committee notes that "the

the

[sic] to

legislative proposal that will give student-

Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, in 1995-96

NCAA ANNUAL

146, 146.

NCAA, 997 NCAA CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note
1

Id.

(emphasis supplied).

1

86, at

A- 1 26

to

A-

1

27.

.
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by ensuring that students don't use their

would be argued, achieving "pay"). It
could also be argued, of course, and seems clear to this writer, that the primary
reason that the Division I and II legislation did not go further (but did protect
coaches) is that the financial interests of the institutions drove the legislation and
not student-athlete welfare. At the very least, the debate and the outcome
demonstrates that the present NCAA regulatory scheme poorly protects student
"athletic ability" for notoriety (thus,

it

interests.

As

discussed above, publicly-funded institutions are obligated to respect
199
student speech rights, and there is no exception for student-athlete speech.
As
also noted earlier, private institutions have adopted statements of rights
responsibilities that provide for similar student speech protections.

and

200

Thus, it
cannot simply assume that it may limit the
speech a la in loco parentis; they should have grappled with the question of
rights, not merely with question of privileges. That the convention discussions
did not raise the issue indicates again how the bifurcated nature of modern
institutions with significant athletic programs negatively impacts student-athlete

seems

that the

interests.

But

NCAA's members

201

let

us consider the legal questions further.

Can

publicly funded

institutions escape criticism by classifying student-athlete speech as "commercial
speech?" Indeed, the courts have shown some willingness to tolerate greater
202
but this tolerance does not save the
restrictions on commercial speech,
203
Traditionally, commercial speech is speech that
NCAA's approaches.
204
proposes a transaction.
The Division I and II legislation at issue here clearly
reaches far beyond commercial speech to include noncommercial speech. But

199.

See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying

text.

200.

See supra notes

1

86-95 and accompanying

text.

20 1

See supra notes

1

89-94 and accompanying

text.

202.

See, e.g., Central

&

Hudson Gas

Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.

Comm'n, 447

(1980) (acknowledging limitations on protections of commercial speech but rejecting

promotional speech by public

may be commercial even
Trs. v. Fox,

if

utility as

U.S.

state

557

ban on

not sufficiently linked to compelling state interest). Speech

the proposition includes speech about noncommercial issues. Bd. of

492 U.S. 469, 474-75 (1989) (remanding

for consideration of

dorm room

presentations of commercial products within student

whether banned

constituted commercial speech;

case later dismissed as moot).

203.

Division

commercial

I

and

same
204.

is

not on

transaction. This fact that Division

even clearer by comparing
the

legislation

II

it

to that adopted

I

face limited only to speech that proposes a

its

and

II

legislation

by Division

III

intentionally broad

is

made

during the same time period and within

legislative package.

See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S.

at

562.

In Central

Hudson

analysis to determine whether a regulation of commercial speech
scrutiny.

was

Id. at

misleading."

Id.

566.

First,

the court used a four-part

would survive

First

Amendment

protected speech must at least involve "lawful activity and not be

Second, the "asserted governmental interest" must be "substantial."

Id.

If both

of these conditions are met, then the courts must consider "whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted" and "whether

it is

narrowly tailored to serve that interest."

Id.
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even if one construes the legislation regulation more narrowly, as affecting only
speech about sports to sports media (and that interpretation is not consistent with
the partial prohibition on films and plays), the regulation still falls flat when
measured against First Amendment doctrine. Commercial speech regulation
traditionally is concerned with ensuring accuracy so that the public may make
205
If the restrictions reach
informed choices based upon truthful information.
beyond this concern, the Supreme Court has said that "there is far less reason to
206
depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands."
None of the restrictions on expression discussed above appear to vindicate an
accuracy concern. Finally, regulations of commercial speech must be narrowly
207
As the Sports Illustrated
tailored to satisfy a substantial governmental interest.
matter demonstrates, the NCAA's restrictions were, and they are, far-reaching.
Is the promulgation of amateur sports so substantial a governmental interest that
such broad restrictions on speech and other fundamental rights would be
208
And
considered justified? Such an outcome would herald a sad day indeed.

205.

See 44 Liquormart,

interest in protecting

Rhode

Inc. v.

Island,

517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996).

consumers from 'commercial harms'

"It is the State's

why

that provides 'the typical reason

commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.'"
Id. at

502 (plurality opinion) (quoting City of Cincinnati

426 (1993)). "Yet bans

that target truthful,

consumers from such harms."
this traditional interest "not

issues

of public policy

respond

.

.

Id. at

50 1

85,
.

Discovery Network,

Inc.,

507 U.S. 410,

nonmisleading commercial messages rarely protect

502-03. Thus, the Court stated that bans that are broader than

only hinder consumer choice, but also impede debate over central

[and] usually rest solely

'irrationally' to the truth."

Township, 431 U.S.
206.

.

Id. at

v.

at

Id.

on the offensive assumption

503 (quoting Linmark Assocs.

that the public will

Willingbow

Inc. v.

96 (1977)).

Two recent Supreme Court cases reflect a possible expansion

view of commercial speech

In

rights.

Rubin

v.

in the

Courts'

Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), a

unanimous Court struck down a federal law prohibiting the disclosure of the alcohol content of beer
on labels or

in advertising.

Id. at

The

478.

facilitating state efforts to regulate alcohol

which would

result in

legislation did not "directly
its

government claimed an

interest sufficiently substantial

state statute prohibiting the advertising

both

Id. at

Id. at

483-85. The

and concluded that the overall

and materially advance" the other asserted

regulatory scheme.

interest in

and preventing "strength wars" among beer brewers,

consumers buying beer based upon alcohol content.

Court did not find the former

inconsistencies in

federal

interest

because of

486-88. In another case, the Court struck

of retail prices for alcohol. 44 Liquormart, 5 1 7 U.S.

down
at

a

589.

Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, distinguished restrictions that are designed to ensure

accuracy from restrictions that "entirely prohibit[] the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading

commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a
at

501

.

In both cases, the Court

fair

bargaining process."

Id.

emphasized that the statutes went beyond the historical concern

of ensuring the accuracy of commercial speech so that the public can make informed decisions
based upon reliable information. See

id. at

207.

See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S.

208.

The passage of statutes

On

at

483.

at 566.

prohibiting sports agents from providing benefits to student-

athletes and limiting their contact with

protecting amateurism.

504; Rubin, 574 U.S.

them suggests

at least an asserted

governmental

interest in

the other hand, arguably, these statutes are aimed at protecting the
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once again, it may be argued that given their breadth, these restrictions are
designed to protect commercialism, not amateurism.
What of an argument that students have contracted away these rights in
exchange for the right to play intercollegiate athletics at their institution? Such
an argument must also fail. Although courts have held that playing athletics is
209
in other contexts they have rejected claims that a
a privilege, not a right,
waiver of constitutional rights particularly First Amendment rights is an
appropriate condition for states to impose upon the granting of such "privileges."

—

—

Significantly, in this debate, as in so

many

athletics regulations, students received only that

NCAA

financial interests of the

which was consistent with the

as a whole or the particular educational

presumption of a right to

institution affected. Sadly, the

speech and associational
NCAA amateurism rules.

others about intercollegiate

restrict student-athlete

scheme of
Consider, for example, the NCAA limitations on
participation
in
events
and on teams not sponsored by member
students'
institutions. These restrictions are riddled with so many exceptions that one
cannot reasonably explain them as a function of educational decisions about what
rights cuts across the entire legislative

best for students or even best for intercollegiate athletics as a whole. Instead,
many of them appear to result from political compromises designed to protect
is

commercial

For example, basketball student-athletes in Division I are
declared ineligible if they participate in organized amateur competitions not
210
sponsored by their member institutions or excepted by the NCAA.
Division
I students in sports other than basketball may practice with outside teams but
may not compete with them. 211 A few cases have considered student-athletes'
First Amendment rights, but they have all focused narrowly on whether enforced
eligibility rules improperly affect the freedom to associate with other amateur or
212
professional athletes. The answer to that much easier question has been "no."

commercial
Bus.

interests.

of the

interests

& Prof. CODE

many of which

institutions involved,

18895-18897.97 (West 1997).

And

indicated that the protection of amateur sports

treatment because

some

may be sufficient to grant favored

restrictions are necessary to enable the product

See supra note 174 and accompanying

knowledge, none of the cases to date have

text.

pitted rights as

On

the other hand, to this author's

Amendment against amateurism or parity concerns. Moreover,
when the essential purpose of the action is to promote athletics
argument

that

of intercollegiate athletics

fundamental as those protected under the
this

First

institutions be allowed to use the

a regulation

is

1

needed

when education

209.

See supra note

210.

1997-98

211.

Ai. at

212.

For example,

1

1

to protect

amateurism. See

NCAA policies and give

the central goal).

72 and accompanying

NCAA Division

I

text.

Manual, supra

note 193, at 238.

58.
in

Karmanos v. Baker, 8 6 F.2d 258 (6th
1

athlete desiring to play at an
ineligibility.

is

author believes that only

educational nature, should

Carter, supra note 4, at 90-95 (courts must distinguish varying goals of

deference only

Cal.

as noted earlier, in the antitrust context,

some judges have
to exist.

are state entities. See, e.g,

The

NCAA

Cir.

1

987), a Canadian student-

American university unsuccessfully challenged a declaration of

issued the

declaration

uncompensated basis for a professional Canadian team.

because the athlete had played on an
Id. at

260.

The student brought an

action

1

.
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90

Overall, the legislation emerging from what we may call this "student-athlete
free speech debate" demonstrates the distance that has divided institutions into

and other fiefdoms. The legislation considered the studentIt is difficult to imagine such a rule being
athlete solely as "athlete."
promulgated in some other department of the institution without serious
questions of the First Amendment and/or academic freedom and general student
speech rights being raised.
athletic fiefdoms

B.

Financial Aid and the Right to Work

NCAA regulation of student-athlete employment and financial aid issues also
provide clear examples demonstrating the presumption of absolute control over
student-athletes and the financial interests that often lead regulators to ignore

student-athlete rights.

The conflict is particularly prevalent in Division I, and thus

approaches will be the focus of this section.
In earlier times, the question of whether institutions should provide financial
aid to student-athletes on the basis of their athletic ability was hotly-debated. In
1 948, opponents of athletically-based financial aid were successful in altering the
NCAA's constitution to expressly prohibit any such aid. Article III of the
constitution set forth five "principles": (a) "Amateurism"; (b) "Institutional
Control and Responsibility"; (c) "Sound Academic Standards"; (d) "Financial
213
These principles later became known
Aid to Athletes"; and (e) "Recruiting."
214
The first three principles found their roots in the old
as the "Sanity Code."
215
and the last two were new public statements.
constitution,
The "Principles Governing Financial Aid to Athletes" flatly banned all
athletically-related financial aid, but provided that a member institution could
award aid to athletes if it based the award on non-athletic qualifications, such as
its

under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 (Supp.

exercising his First

Amendment

V

1999), claiming that the disqualification penalized

right to associate with others.

court found no violation of the student's associational rights.
did not prohibit him from association per
the
it

NCAA could declare him ineligible.

fails to illuminate the logic for the

However, even

if

Karmanos

the grounds that (1) there
athletes,

is

se,

See

Id.

The court reasoned

at 260.

for

The

that the rule

but that if he did play for a professional team, then
id.

The court's explanation merely

restates the rule;

outcome.
followed,

was no question

and (2) athletes like the one

Karmanos, 816 F.2d

him

in

it

can be distinguished from the current debate on

that the athlete in

Karmanos would

other amateurs by competing with professionals.

Karmanos played with professional

gain an unfair competitive benefit against

In contrast, the

NCAA

regulations discussed

Karmanos

above apply to play for concededly amateur organizations. Moreover, the

athlete in

actually didplay on a professional team, and although the facts are unclear, he

may have had reason

to

know

that his

Divisions

I

and

amateur status might be affected.

II

were

revisiting the rules

248-50 and accompanying

947

went

to press,

on professional play prior to college. See infra notes

text.

NCAA YEARBOOK, supra note

213.

1

214.

Falla, supra note

215.

See

1

Id. Ironically, as this article

5, at

1

47, at 2 1 2- 1 3 ; see also

132-35; see also

946 YEARBOOK, supra note 2 1 4,

at

NCAA,
1

72-73

id.

1946 NCAA

at

1

88-92.

YEARBOOK

172-73.

1
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The code
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further required that "[a]ny scholarship or other

aid" to student-athletes had to be awarded through an institution-approved

agency.

217

The "Principle Governing Recruiting" prohibited

athletics staff or
other officials from soliciting prospective athletes with the promise of financial
aid.

218

In order to enforce these principles, the

NCAA established a constitutional

compliance committee to interpret the code in instances of charged non219
If an institution was found to have violated the code, then its
compliance.

membership was

to be terminated.

220

end the approach was a disaster. There are indications that the NCAA
leadership may have railroaded the legislation through in response to negative
press reporting alleging improper institutional financial support of athletes.
Indeed, the NCAA's executive committee took the unusual step of approving the
establishment of the compliance committee even before the membership had
voted to adopt the rules and limit the ability of members to make amendments. 221
The lack of membership consensus on the aid question created difficulties later.
In the following year, seven institutions
The Citadel, Boston College,
University of Maryland, Villanova, Virginia Military Institute, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, and University of Virginia were found in violation of the
code, and the compliance committee moved for their expulsion from the
NCAA. 222 Among other charges, the committee claimed that at least some of the
223
Sensing wider
institutions provided free room and board to football players.
support among NCAA members, the accused institutions unified themselves and
224
Led by their own
the membership against the compliance committee charges.
Presidents, these seven colleges and universities put the compliance committee
and the NCAA itself on trial and the compliance committee failed to obtain the
In the

—

—

—

necessary two-thirds majority for expulsion.

NCAA Yearbook, supra note

216.

1947

217.

Id

218.

Id.

219.

Id. at

220.

FALL A, supra note

221.

See generally 1947

147, at 213.

198-99 (discussing adopted executive regulation establishing the committee).
5, at

1

34.

NCAA YEARBOOK,

President Lieb noted that unusual action
scrutiny" and

225

supra note 147,

was taken because

"many eyes throughout the country [were on

noted that amendments

at the

the

at 185-96, 198-99.

NCAA

NCAA

was "under very close

the] convention." Id. at

1

86-87. Lieb

convention would violate the NCAA rule requiring two weeks notice

of any constitutional changes and urged members to leave interpretational issues to the compliance
committee.

Id. at

187. This put voters in the position of voting either in favor of, or against, the

entire package. Indeed,

when a member proposed an amendment to permit some athletic subsidies,

Lieb suggested that the speaker was out of order in light of the earlier comments. See
222.

1949

NCAA

YEARBOOK, supra

note

176,

institutions).

223.

See

id. at

191-92.

224.

See

id. at

206.

225.

The vote was

1 1 1

to 93. See

id. at

205-07.

id. at

189.

191-207 (noting charges against the

.
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harshness of the action as the
However, the convention
transcript suggests that just as important was the division over the question of
student financial aid itself and whether or not schools should provide it. Those
official history describes the

defining issue in the "Sanity

Code"

debate.

226

who desired to build athletic

programs knew that if athletes were not provided
athletics-based scholarships, many would be forced to take off-campus jobs,
allowing them less time for athletics. These individuals viewed the attempts to
227
On the other
limit institutional aid as an attempt to undercut athletic programs.
hand, some felt that athletic scholarships were against everything an academic
institution stood for and that this concession would mean the end of amateurism
and academic integrity.
Although no students or student representatives participated in any of these
debates, some of the speakers did address student welfare and rights, both when
the legislation was first considered and later when the termination question was
brought to the floor. One speaker argued that the rule penalized student-athletes
who wanted to play on teams. This speaker considered it wiser to give an athlete
two meals a day, rather than require him to practice for two hours a day and then
work to earn his meal. 228 The Citadel, a South Carolina military institution,
argued that military men, with their rigorous training schedule, could not find
work with hours reasonable enough to permit them to earn their expenses. 229
Others also argued that the subsidy rules were far too strict and did not allow
schools who invited athletics participation and required training as a prerequisite
230
to provide for the legitimate needs of student-athletes.
As most readers know, in the years following these debates, scholarships
based at least in part on athletic ability, became quite common in what ultimately
became the Division I and Division II schools. 231 But once it became clear that
athletic scholarships were inevitable there arose fears, particularly in Division I,
that some institutions would use the promise of student aid to gain competitive
advantages or would permit an institution to completely undercut remaining payfor-play restrictions under the guise of giving a student institutional financial aid.
Driven by these concerns, the NCAA restricted a full- or partial-scholarship
student-athlete's ability to obtain financial aid from other sources including

employment during the school

term.

beginning in the early 1950s, the
requiring all financial aid, except

First,

NCAA started to control the sources of aid,
226.

See Falla, supra note

227.

For discussion of efforts to

1948 convention,

YEARBOOK
far too

see, for

190-207).

strict

President,

229.

1

32-35.

restrict aid

through the adoption of the Sanity Code

example, Carter, supra note

and did not allow

948

1

4, at

institutions

room

NCAA,

1948

to provide for the legitimate financial

1949 NCAA YEARBOOK, supra note 176,

NCAA YEARBOOK, supra note 227, at 99-

1

American Football Coaches Association).
1

41 n.31 (citing

at

the

NCAA

Many argued that the rules which controlled needs-based financial aid were

student-athletes. See also

228.

5, at

949 NCAA YEARBOOK, supra note

230.

See, e.g.,

23 1

See supra notes

id. at

1

76, at

1

97.

199.
1

76-80 and accompanying

text.

at

needs of

190-205.

00 (comments of Harvey

J.

Harman,

1
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provided by a parent or legal guardian, to be administered by the institution
232
unless otherwise specifically excepted by regulation.
Second, it began to
control the amount of aid. Starting in the mid-1950s, it provided that such aid
233
could not exceed the commonly-accepted costs of education.
In the years that
followed, these aid limits became quite complex in Division I as the NCAA
sought to preserve parity among Division I institutions by regulating the actual
number of scholarships per sport that could be provided and the maximum
amount of financial aid that any student-athlete could receive. 234
In addition, the NCAA also limited a scholarship student-athlete's ability to
get a job to meet his or her financial need. In earlier times, students in need and
without other scholarships had to work because institutions declined to provide
235
financial aid based on athletic ability.
But because many of the jobs studentathletes were suited for arguably involved use of their athletic abilities (such as
lifeguarding or playground camp supervisor), and because the NC AA' s definition
of amateurism was so broad, NCAA regulators began to issue specific
regulations dealing with such jobs and the extent to which student-athletes could
that

them for pay. 236 Eventually, the NCAA expressly included employment
income in the calculation of the cap on total financial aid any Division I studentathlete could receive thus limiting the amount of employment a student-athlete
237
could undertake.
This approach, combined with the aforementioned total
financial aid limits, meant that a student-athlete who had financial needs above
the established cap for financial aid could not work to fill that need, and thus had
take

at

NCAA YEARBOOK 217-18, 254.

See

NCAA,

1951

135 (noting

NCAA

Council's adoption of twelve-point plan that included recommendations

232.

proposing that

NCAA

institutions limit

Manual, supra note

be administered by the
specifically

amount of financial aid

exempted by

all

aid received

5,

Compare 996-97,
1

by the student-athlete

from a parent or guardian or unless the aid source

is

NCAA rule).

Throughout 1955 and 1956, the

233.

to student-athletes).

128, at 205-06 (requiring that

institution unless

See generally Fall a, supra note

NCAA

Council, then a body charged with issuing

interim decisions between conventions, issued an interpretation of the amateurism rules stating that
institutional financial aid should not

additional aid

exceed "commonly accepted educational expenses and that

would be considered pay

for play." This

was apparently the beginning of NCAA's

attempts to set maximum limits for student-athlete financial aid. This approach would broaden until
the

NCAA set maximum per athlete guidelines

for particular sports as well as total scholarship

number guidelines for particular sports. See 2000-01 Division I NCAA Manual, supra note

177,

at 178, 188-96.

234.

See id

235.

See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (resistance to aid based upon athletic

ability).

See 1955-56 YEARBOOK, supra note 147,

236.

Amateurism" allowing

at 5 (special exceptions

under "Principle of

student-athletes to serve as playground supervisors, lifeguards, and other

roles).

237.
Division

E.g.,
I

1996-97 NCAA Manual, supra note 128, at 21 2 (requiring

institution to consider

student employment in determining whether permissible aid limits reached, that

grant-in-aid).

is,

a full
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cover the balance.

Perhaps one would justify at least some of these work limits on a theory that
a student-athlete could not reasonably practice, play sports, and also hold down
an outside job. However, to find the basis for work limits upon that theory, one
would need the help of the in loco parentis doctrine which, again, had been
abandoned as to nonathlete students. Moreover, if time commitments of needy
student-athletes was the primary consideration, institutions could have cut back
on athletic programs to allow more time for work or, alternatively, eliminated the
need for work by meeting a student-athlete's full, true need. However, it is more
likely that work limits that left a need gap found a basis in the obsession with
amateurism and the battle among institutions for competitive parity. On the
amateurism side, concern may have existed that institutions would actually use
alleged work arrangements to funnel additional monies to student-athletes. On
the parity side, there were likely concerns that a promise to arrange work for a
student or work that was really not work at all but a means of funneling
additional money to the student—could be a powerful recruiting tool. Thus,
institutional distrust within the NCAA led to rules that dramatically reduced
student freedoms and opportunities and significantly. Moreover, the rules often
affected athletes in revenue-producing as well as non-revenue-producing sports
alike. The results were some rather odd permutations on student work and
financial aid rights. For example, in the 1980s and early 1990s, NCAA rules
allowed a Division I scholarship student-athlete to work and not count the
income as financial aid, so long as the employer deposited all of the
student-athlete's earnings with the institution, which then could use the money
238
Initially, the NCAA even restricted student-athlete access to
as it saw fit.
federal financial aid grants by counting money received thereby against NCAA

—

aid caps, irrespective

of the student's

financial need.

In 1984, after

much

239

it modified that position.
January
In
1997, the NCAA restructuring vote allowed each division more

controversy,

freedom

to

make

own

its

rules.

As

part

NCAA revisited the right to work issue.
238.

1989-90

NCAA MANUAL, supra note

of the restructuring

legislation, the

Consequently, legislation was passed

169, at 140.

In 1988-89, the

NCAA

Council

permitted this arrangement because the student-athlete never received the money, thereby

NCAA concerns were competitive parity and adherence to
amateurism. See NCAA, 988-89 NCAA Manual 4 8.
239.
See NCAA, 1984 NCAA PROCEEDINGS 52-53. In 984, members moved to amend the
NCAA rules so that student-athletes would be legally entitled to Pell Grants based upon
emphasizing that the primary

1

1

1

1

To accomplish this, Pell Grants would be removed from the aid figured
into the "cap" imposed by divisions. See id. at 152. Members who supported the amendment
argued that to deny students in need was unfair and possibly illegal, particularly when NCAA rules

demonstrated need. See

id.

also prohibited students from working. Id. at 152-53.

proposal was

first

voted

down by a

reconsider and after discussion

it

vote of

374

With a two

to 226.

eventually passed.

Id.

Id.

thirds majority required, the

The supporters then moved

to

These discussions demonstrate the

precarious nature of student-athlete rights in a representative body where institutional financial
interests are at stake.

1

.
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student-athletes to earn the difference between

and the cost of attendance, provided that the student remained
240
academically eligible to compete for the institution.
But there was significant opposition to the change. Opponents argued that
athletic departments would have to get involved in setting up student
employment and raised the difficulties of monitoring student financial receipts. 241
That opposition was so significant that in August 1997, the governing board for
Division I voted to suspend the rule loosening work limits for one year. 242 By
January 1 998, a compromise agreement was reached. Essentially, the emerging
Division I rule capped the amount the student- athlete could earn in legitimate offcampus employment by allowing the student-athlete to work up to the amount of
the grant-in-aid—that is, books, tuition, fees, room and board (but not other
243
The revised rule requires the student to file
expenses) plus $2000.
244
information about that employment with the athletic department.
This rule was
certainly an improvement from complete limitations on work. Still, it continued
limitations on student work in all cases. Moreover, the $2000 cap on earnings
for students on a full-grant-in-aid limited the pool of employers.
The final bell on these contentious financial aid issues in Division I has yet
to ring. Only weeks before this article went to press, Division I's Management
Council voted to lift the $2000 cap on work restrictions for its student-athletes.
At press time, that decision awaits final approval by the Division I board. 245
Significantly, none of these convention discussions of legislation limiting
their scholarship

—

240.

1

997-98

NCAA DIVISION

I

MANUAL, supra

note

grant-in-aid consists of tuition, course-required books, fees,

24 1

E.g. ,

1

1

93, at

1

80.; see also id. at

room and

1

76

(full

board).

997 NCAA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1 86, at 3 1 5 (commenter raising monitoring

concerns, noting students can work during vacations and summers and that some student-athletes
are better off financially than nonathlete students under existing financial aid rules). See also
at

A-128-A134
242.

(original

See, e.g. ,

id.

1997 proposals).

Management Councils Start with New Structure, NCAANEWS, Aug.

at 10 (noting that Division

Management Council expressed support

I

for theory

NCAANEWS, July 7,

1

997, at

1

(noting Big

8,

1

997,

of Proposition 62,

but voted in favor of one-year delay before implementation); see also Division I

Reaction to Earnings Issue,

1

Board Seeks

Ten Conference's request

for a one-year moratorium).

243.

See 2000-01 Division

as "tuition and fees,

room and

a student to earn up to a

I

Manual, supra note 177 (defining Division

board, and required course-related books");

full grant-in-aid

plus

$2000 while working

at

id. at

institution); id. at

work

rules,

files

full grant-in-aid

182-83 (allowing

legitimate off-campus

employment so long as the student is academically eligible to compete for the
a year at the institution, and

I

institution,

has spent

information on the employment with the athletic department of

176-78 (outlining permissible financial

aid,

including institutionally-arranged

and declaring that the student-athlete may not participate

receives financial aid that exceeds a

full grant-in-aid); id. at

school year except that expressly permitted,

is

in athletics if

he or she

178 (noting that employment during

counted as financial

aid).

244.

Id. at

245.

See Management Councils Take Mountain-Sized Steps at Denver Session, NCAANEWS,

Apr. 15,2002.

182-83.
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student employment considered whether students facing need gaps might have
an independent "right to work" under the U.S. Constitution at publicly-supported
institutions.

Although the issue

found a "right to work"

in the

is

rarely litigated today, the

Fourteenth

work

Supreme Court has

Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution,

common

occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that
246
Where the
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."
limitations are applied to a suspect class (a point not at issue here), restrictions
stating that "the right to

for a living in the

247

But even where the class is not one
traditionally treated as suspect, the states must offer some rational basis to
support the restriction and demonstrate that it is narrowly tailored to serve a
legitimate purpose. Work restrictions were born of distrust among Division I
schools. But in depriving student-athletes of work opportunities, institutions
deprived students not only of money, but of the opportunity to learn of the
educational value of work experience that does not involve athletics. Students
in non-revenue producing sports and those who do not seek careers as
professional athletes (including many women) often need to show experience
other than athletics participation on their resumes. For some athletes, "I played
sports" alone is simply not enough, and for others, it simply should not be
enough.
As this Article is being published dramatic changes are taking place as all
three Divisions rethink their regulation of amateur athletics. In 2001, Division
II adopted sweeping revisions to its amateurism rules allowing students to accept
some pay for play prior to entering college full time. 248 Division III has stayed
are subject to the strictest scrutiny.

Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915); see also Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717

246.

(1973) (holding that Fourteenth

Amendment prohibited

state

from requiring U.S. citizenship as a

prerequisite to bar admission).

247.

Historically,

have been directed
at

most of the right to work restrictions that have been challenged in the courts

at aliens,

a suspect class subject to

strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Griffiths,

41 3 U.S.

71 8 (finding U.S. citizenship limitation on admission to state bar a denial of equal protection);

Graham

v.

Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that a state's fifteen-year residency

requirements for welfare recipients and that a state's conditioning receipt of benefits upon
citizenship violated the Equal Protection Clause); Takahashi

410 (1948) (finding unconstitutional

state

at

40-43 (holding

Fish

& Game Comm'n,

334 U.S.

law that prohibited issuance of commercial fishing

licenses to persons ineligible for citizenship and

Truax, 239 U.S.

v.

state labor

was

specifically intended to affect Japanese);

law requiring eighty percent of hired workers to be

"qualified electors or native-born citizens" of the United States violated the Equal Protection

Clause);
test

cf.

Mass. Bd. of Ret.

under equal protection

police force); Cornwell

v.

v.

Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (applying rational basis

to uphold statute requiring

Hamilton, 80

F.

mandatory retirement at age

fifty

Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (granting

from

state

summary

judgment to plaintiff, a braider of African- American natural hair who claimed that as applied to her
situation, the state's

248.

At

its

cosmetology rules were unconstitutional).

2001 convention, Division

experience for pre-college students.

It is

II

voted to discount certain low level professional

worth noting however, that much of the support for this

approach came from those who desired to make it easier to recruit and play foreign student-athletes,

.
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pay for play and standing against special consideration of
249
And in the same meeting in which
athletic ability in the financial aid process.
the Division I Management Council voted to lift the employment cap for studentathletes, it also excepted some pay for play prior to full time college admission
from its amateurism regulations, but did not go as far as Division II. 250
Whether the new changes are good for student-athletes remains to be seen.
It remains true, however, that changes to recognize and redress legitimate
student-athlete concerns have come slowly in the NCAA, complicated by
competing financial and parity concerns, particularly at the big time athletic
programs. These examples of regulatory debates concerning free speech and the
right to work demonstrate the presumption of NCAA control that pervades its
legislative approaches and the fact that the perversion of in loco parentis remains
a key concern for student-athletes.
the course in rejecting

responding to the perversion of in loco parentis:
Using Nonprofit Organizations to Support Student- Athletes
iv.

have argued that an enormous difference exists between the controls that
colleges and universities exercise over their student-athletes and those that they
exercise over non-athlete students. I have further argued that a perversion of in
I

loco parentis doctrine in intercollegiate athletics regulation, as well as the
bifurcation of educational institutions into athletic and nonathletic venues, has
led to this difference in treatment

of athletes and nonathletes.

differences in treatment are justified, too

many

are driven

by

While some
institutional

interests, financial and otherwise, that operate contrary to student welfare or

student rights.

This writer believes that the

NCAA and

its

member

protect student-athletes adequately. This observation

case of Division
II

and

251

III.

I

is

institutions

can never

particularly true in the

student-athletes, but also applies to a lesser extent to Divisions

At this point

in history, the

reasons

why have

to

little

do with good

who often have experience playing with teams that receive minimal pay. The new rule bans payment
"after initial full-time collegiate enrollment," suggesting that pay before that time is acceptable. See

2001-02 Division
restrictions

II

NCAA Manual, supra note

178, at 58, 59, 60.

on pre-college students including the

restriction

on

It

continued some amateurism

preferential treatment based

upon

athletic ability. Id. at 59.

249.

See Division

III

Charts

New Path for Financial Compliance, NCAA NEWS,

Jan. 15,

200 1 (Division adopted new compliance provisions and reaffirmed that aid must be consistent with
that

given to nonathlete students); see also 2001-02 Division

(Division

250.

III

Manual provisions regarding

Division

I

interests in athletics

remains true that student-athlete

of in loco parentis.

it

does not exceed expenses.

It

interests

1

79

declined to

against playing with professional players prior to enrollment. See

News, supra note 242.
25 1
While financial
it

NCAA Manual, supra note

aid).

excepted pay up to the point that

remove the prohibition

III

and

may not be as prevalent in the

latter

institutional interests are not the

two

NCAA

divisions,

same as in the days
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or bad intentions.

First, the

NCAA,

909

the athletic conferences and the other

organizations that work together to regulate intercollegiate athletics have as their

mission the protection of the interests of their membership. That membership is
comprised of educational institutions, not student-athletes. And as the in loco
parentis doctrine has yielded to a broader conception of student rights, it can no
longer be presumed that student interests and institutional interests are the same.
When student-athlete and member institution interests conflict, then,
appropriately, these organizations must choose to advocate their member
interests. Given the diversity of those interests, the NCAA's policy almost
always reflects political compromise. The need for compromise may be less
significant after restructuring, but it remains. Second, because the NCAA and
its conferences are political actors that must balance competing interests among
the diverse institutions that are their members, they are inefficient vehicles for
student-athlete protection. Student-athlete issues must always be merged into
some membership interest in order to be heard. Even when these bodies reach
decisions that benefit student-athletes, and sometimes they do, the process that
led to those decisions is often a long and arduous one and the relief tends to come
in bits and pieces of scattered legislation rather than comprehensive approaches.
The tortured road student-athlete issues must take is demonstrated by the
252
aforementioned debates over student-athlete speech rights and student-athlete
253
financial aid.
Third, as history demonstrates and as I have discussed in this
Article, the pressures from media, alumni, and even students, to grow sports
programs and to win make it difficult for educational institutions to take the steps
needed to ensure student-athlete welfare, even when they know they should. A
balancing of student-athlete interests and institutional interests may be the only
way to run intercollegiate athletic programs. The problem is that institutional
interests are powerfully represented, but there is currently minimal representation
of student-athlete interests. Currently, there is no entity that can offer an
effective counterbalance to institutional perspectives. Such an entity is needed.
Student-athletes need unfettered access to an organization independent of
intercollegiate-athletics regulators, but one that values the essentials of a system
that attempts to integrate athletics and education. The law has a structure for
such an organization, specifically 26 U.S.C. §50 1(c)(3) which allows the
254
formation of nonprofit organizations for charitable and other purposes.

252.

See discussion supra, Part

III.A.

253.

See discussion supra, Part

III.B.

254.

26 U.S.C.

§ 501(c)(3) (1994).

The statute provides tax exemption

for contributions to

entities "operated exclusively for" inter alia, "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international

competition (but only

equipment)

if

no part of

its

activities involve the provision

amateur sports

of athletic

facilities

or

" Other uses for nonprofits have been proposed before. In 1993, Professor Leroy

D. Clark proposed that civil rights organizations (usually nonprofits) be enlisted to

otherwise advocate on behalf of black student-athletes.

file

lawsuits and

Clark argued that black athletes were

suffering exploitation that rises to the level of a civil rights violation. See Leroy D. Clark,

Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36

How.

New
L.J.
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Currently, several 501(c)(3)s designed to support amateur athletics exist.
However, most include amateur athletics concerns along with a hodgepodge of

other concerns (including, for example, support of professional athletes). As I
will discuss below,
regulatory restrictions limit the impact of these
organizations by limiting the ways in which they can support and communicate
with student-athletes. Because of these
limitations, some of these

NCAA

NCAA

organization have organized around serving both professional and amateur
interests in order to remain viable. The most ambitious project to date has been
the recently-formed College Athletes Coalition, a movement to form local
associations of Division

I

college football athletes on campuses across the

255

The nonprofit model proposed in this piece goes further than existing
models to take on NCAA restrictions. If student-athlete welfare is truly an
interest of the NCAA and its members, the NCAA and member institutions

country.

should give their blessings to the project.

Why a Nonprofit?

A.

Several scholars have recognized the overall unfairness of institutional
256
I have tried to contribute
athletics policies as they relate to student-athletes.

259,

274 ( 1 993). The focus of the proposed nonprofit mentioned in this Article is not on race-based

discrimination, but rather

on economic and

Professor Clark that some

of the exploitation of black student-athletes does rise to the level of a

concern.

civil rights

In 1997,

political

empowerment. However,

Melvin Braziel argued

LAW.

J.

81,

do agree with

that student-athletes should themselves

organize into an association. Melvin L. Braziel, Jr., United
for Educational Reform, 4 SPORTS

I

We Stand: Organizing Student-Athletes

84 (1997).

This Article does not assume the

formation of an "association" organized by student-athletes themselves.

For discussion of

unionization proposals, see infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text. Finally, in 200 1 the Knight
,

Commission suggested the establishment of an independent "Institute for Intercollegiate Athletics"
that

could monitor intercollegiate athletics and sustain public pressure to maintain amateurism and

academic

Athletics,

See Knight Found.

and other values.

integrity

A Call to Action 30 (2001

Comm'n on Intercollegiate

).

One key issue for this group is year-round medical coverage for athletes to buffer injury
during so-called voluntary workouts. See, e.g. .Transcript, ESPN, Outside the Lines: Campus
255.

Activists, Apr. 29, 2001.

association

is

Rev., Apr.
256.

7,

unclear.

2002

at

See, e.g. ,

Whether

Sam

Ross,

this

Jr.,

group will evolve

into

Group Gives Unionization

a union or remain a non-union
the

Old College

Try,

TRIBUNE-

www.pittsburghlive.eom/x/tribune-review/sports//s_65201. html.

Kevin Broyles, NCAA Regulation ofIntercollegiate Athletics, Time for a New

Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487 (1995); Timothy Davis, A Model ofInstitutional Governance for
Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 Wis. L.

minority athletes); C. Peter Goplerud

Rev. 599; Davis, supra note 58 (regarding unfairness to

III,

Payfor Playfor College Athletes: Now, More Than Ever,

38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1081, 1089 (1997) (arguing for some form of stipends or other pay for studentathletes); Alfred

Dennis Mathewson, Symposium, The Eligibility Paradox, 1 VlLL. SPORTS

& ENT.

L.J.

83 (2000) (challenging view that educational concerns drive NCAA policy); Gary R. Roberts,

The

NCAA,

Antitrust,

treatment of

and Consumer

Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631 (1996) (suggesting antitrust

NCAA by courts is too lenient).
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to this debate

by putting

explanation for

why

it

that unfairness in

its

has occurred and

historical context

why

it

91

and offering an

An

has been sustained.

independent nonprofit, particularly an entity organized under 26 U.S.C. §
501 (c)(3), is needed to do what the NCAA and members simply cannot do. Such
or several
with a focus on welfare issues, would provide a
an organization
counterbalance for analysis of those policies heavily affected by institutional

—

—

financial and parity considerations.

Such a nonprofit should be organized on the assumption that keeping a strong
link between education and campus athletics is highly desirable. The link is
important for several reasons. The first and foremost is the lifelong value of
education itself and the unique value of education within the collegiate setting.
Most student-athletes are young people with only limited timespace in which to
pursue education within that setting. A commitment to collegiate education is
needed to counter the forces that would sacrifice this experience an experience
which has long-term financial and intangible values for short-term payoffs that

—

—

may

ultimately undercut the financial and personal futures of student-athletes.

Without this link between education and athletics, this writer believes that term
"amateur" is meaningless in the collegiate setting. Indeed, more exploitation
could follow if educational institutions were permitted to shuttle student-athletes
off into "campus minor leagues" from which the institutions draw profits with no
corresponding obligation to provide a total educational experience. At the same
time, a nonprofit must define education broadly to include life skills and other
training and it must seek to rethink what aspects of the pure amateurists' model
are worth preserving and which are outdated or never had significant value.
The nonprofit option has advantages over unionization, an option suggested
257
Only "employees" may form unions, but institutions have long
by some.
resisted the characterization of student-athletes as employees because that may
result in other obligations as well, such as the obligation to pay workers'
258
compensation.
A nonprofit is also easier to set up than a union, the latter

257.

In the 1980s,

Dick DeVenzio, a former basketball player

at

Duke

University, and head

of the Major College Players Association, unsuccessfully argued for a union of college athletes.
Sidelines,

CHRON. HIGHER Educ, Dec.

3, 1986, at 34;

see also Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust:

Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 25 1

& nn.309-

1

9

(1

990)

(considering unionization option).

258.

Several courts have held that a student-athlete attending a college or university on an

athletic scholarship

is

not an "employee" of the institution for the purpose of entitlement to

workers' compensation benefits for injury or death sustained during the course of the athletic
activity. See
v.

Graczyk v Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 229 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1986); Rensing

Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs.,

Comm'n, 314
App. 1983).

444N.E.2d 1170

P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957); Coleman

But see Univ. of Denver

v.

v.

(Ind. 1983); State

W. Mich.

Univ.,

Comp.

Ins.

Fund

v.

Indus.

336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich.

Ct.

Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 426 (Colo. 1953) (rejecting

university's contention that student-athlete's

campus job and meal plan were offered exclusively

by reason of his being a student; court referred to testimony

in the record, including that

of the

football coach,

showing that the student's employment was dependent on his playing football); Van

Horn

Accident

v. Indus.

Comm'n, 33

Cal. Rptr. 169, 172-73 (Ct.

App. 1963) (finding prima facie

.
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requiring the identification of bargaining units and elections to select an
259
At the same time, the nonprofit structure can
exclusive bargaining agent.

recognize the differences among student-athletes; several nonprofits could be
formed or one could be split into divisions. The structure even leaves ample

room

for student-athletes

who may conclude

that their

own

interests are well

served by the present structure of strong institutional control and thus choose to
remain unaided by a nonprofit. Nonprofits also have broader access to the courts

Union procedures for resolution of grievances are often
by
the collective bargaining agreement with the employer. In
circumscribed
than unions.

may be required to file their grievances
Labor Relations Board and may be limited in the first

seeking substantial legal redress, unions
first

with the National

instance in their judicial access.

260

The formation of a nonprofit does not exclude

the potential for future classification of student-athletes as employees and their

organization into unions, but the idea offers a middle ground that provides
representation without the objections that can be raised against unionization.

The nonprofit option makes sense because the nonprofit structure already
exists in abundance in amateur athletics and by granting tax exemption status, the
law has recognized the positive role of such organizations. The Black Coaches
Association is, for example, a 501(c)(3) organization primarily made up of
261
Similarly, the Women's Sports Foundation is a
African American coaches.
501(c)(3) dedicated to enhancing the sports experience of girls and women. It
262
invites anyone to be a member, including, presumably student-athletes.
The

NCAA itself is a nonprofit.
Moreover, the NCAA has already demonstrated a willingness to work with
other nonprofit organizations on matters related to athletics. Indeed, each year

NCAA

Foundation provides substantial financial assistance to athleticoriented, independent, nonprofit organizations. For example, in the fall of 1995,
the NCAA approved grants of $50,000 and $35,000 respectively to the National
the

showing of an employment contract where there was evidence
"scholarship'*

money, as well as money

directly

that the student

had received

from the football coach where record did not show

any denial by the football coach that he had made a contract with the student).

Media references

to this issue include Bill Minutaglio,

Bid for Workers Comp: Waldrep Says
'

Former

TCU Football Player Loses

He Was an Employee When Paralyzed in

MORNiNGNEWS,Oct.21, 1997,at24D, 1997
injured in

Athlete Ineligible for Workers

Comp,

'

1

USA TODAY, Oct.

21, 1997, at 3A,

See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §

260.

E.g.,

instance to National

TCU football player

974); see also John Bacon et al., Jury: Injured College

259.

29 U.S.C.

DALLAS

WL 11 529554 (reporting that a Texas jury ruled that,

contrary to the finding of the Texas Worker's Compensation Commission, a

was not employee when he was

'74,

1

59(a)

1997
(1

WL 7017328.

994).

§ 160(a) (granting jurisdiction over certain labor matters in the first

Labor Relations Board).

261

See also http://www.bcasports.org/about_l .asp (history and 501 (c)(3)

262.

See generally http//www. womenssportsfoundation.org; see also http://www.womens

status).

sportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/about/more.html (founding and (501(c)(3) status); http://www.

womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/about/article.html?record=28 (membership open to
anyone).
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1

Association of Basketball Coaches and the Women's Basketball Coaches
Association; a "$6,000 grant in 1995-96 to the U.S. Women's Lacrosse Coaches
Association for officiating-improvement activities," and a $2000 grant "to the

National Association of Collegiate Gymnastics Coaches (Men) to assist with the
263
The
has also formed
compilation of statistical information."
cooperative relationships with a number of foundations that have as their purpose
the promotion of women's sports' issues. For example, the NCAA's GenderEquity Task Force received consulting assistance from organizations such as the

NCAA

National Women's Law Center, the Office for Civil Rights, and the Women's
264
And of course, the
has cooperated with
Sports Foundation.
professional sports unions on numerous projects.
constitution also has long recognized the value of its
The
relationships with nonprofits and other groups through a category of "affiliated
members." These affiliated members are permitted to send a single delegate to
265
The affiliated member
convention, but are not permitted to vote.
the
with matters relating
group
of
associations
concerned
a
broad
list has included
to athletics and representing the interests of persons affiliated with athletics such
266
It is not obvious that a
as registrars, financial aid officers, and coaches.
proposed nonprofit concerned with student-athlete issues should seek affiliated
Because affiliated members must align themselves with NCAA
status.
principles, such status could compromise the organization's independence as a

NCAA

NCAA

NCAA

constructive commentator and critic of intercollegiate athletics policy.

However, the presence of the

NCAA's

affiliated

member

category demonstrates the

past cooperation with nonprofit organizations.

NCAA REG., Aug.

Executive Committee Minutes,

264.

Final Report of the NCAA Gender-Equity Task Force

265.

1

996-97

NCAA Manual, supra note

1

28, at

membership); see also 2001-02 Division

III

1

NCAA

The

263.

affiliated

267

30, 1995, at
1

has also

1

6

(

1

993 ).

5 (describing the rights

and privileges of

NCAA Manual, supra note

179, at 14-15

(same).

266.
include:

The 1 995

NCAA Convention Proceedings lists twenty-four affiliated members.

(1) groups representing particular sports or sports events (e.g.,

Amateur

Association, Basketball Hall of Fame Tip-Off Classic, U.S. Olympic Committee,

These

Softball

USA Basketball,

USA Volleyball, and Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Association); (2) groups representing
coaches

(e.g.,

American Baseball Coaches Association, American Football Coaches Association,

American Volleyball Coaches Association, College Swimming Coaches Association of America,
Inc.,

National Association of Basketball Coaches, National Association of Collegiate Gymnastics

Coaches, National Softball Coaches Association, U.S. Track Coaches Association, and Women's
Basketball Coaches Association); and (3) groups representing administrative personnel concerned

with the issues that the

NCAA addresses (e.g., American Association of Collegiate Registrars and

Admissions

Division I-A Athletics Directors Association, National Strength and

Officers,

Conditioning Association, National Association of Academic Advisors for Athletics, and National
Association of Collegiate

Women

Proceedings 58

Some of the

267.

(1995).

Affiliated

Athletic Administrators).
later

1995

proceedings include similar

members must observe

constitution and bylaws. See, e.g., 2000-01

NCAA,

NCAA Convention

lists.

the bylaws and principles set forth in the

NCAA Division

I

Manual, supra

NCAA

note 177, at 15.
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including press groups and associations,
268

convention and observe proceedings.
These facts demonstrate that the NCAA has had experience with nonprofits
and has even, on occasion, welcomed cooperation with them. They also
demonstrate that just about everyone directly involved in intercollegiate athletics
has some organizational voice that can uniquely represent the concerns of their
groups and that they can call upon to affect athletics policy schools, coaches,
that is, everyone except student-athletes.
financial aid representatives, officials
to attend

its

—

—

B.

As

What Would a Nonprofit Do?

previously stated, nonprofits already perform a host of

work

in

the

amateur athletics world. But eliminating the perversion of in loco parentis is a
key starting point for nonprofit expansion to assist student-athletes in a real way.
In this writer's view, the primary need for a nonprofit organization rests among
those facing the most restrictions. These appear to be athletes in revenueproducing sports and those in nonrevenue-producing sports who are tied to rules
designed with revenue-producing athletes in mind.
The possibilities for nonprofit involvement in assisting these student-athletes
are endless. A nonprofit could, in fact, do the same things for student-athletes
that the nonprofits that assist other groups involved in athletics do. For example,
it could preliminarily review NCAA proposed policies and serve as a thinktank

new

could identify
problems and advocate and agitate for changes. A nonprofit could monitor
educational and medical support at institutions to ensure that it is both of high
quality and consistent for student-athletes, rather than dependent upon the
for

proposals to better the student-athletes' situation.

—

—

student-athlete attends.

institution that the

information, including leadership training.

269

It

could provide educational
Such programs should be seen not
It

"pay for play," but as restitutional and compensatory programs, that is,
programs to provide for needs created by athletics involvement or to restore
experiences, opportunities and benefits that student-athletes must forgo because
as

of that involvement.
Should the NCAA or member schools ever decide

approve stipends to
student-athletes or to offer some other additional financial aid to them, a
nonprofit could serve as an independent vehicle for the distribution of those
funds, and even as a trustee. This writer has suggested, for example, that instead
of direct stipends, which might be at very low levels, or perhaps in addition to
stipends, student-athletes should be entitled to contributions from member
institutions similar to the contributions an employer would make to individual

268.

See 1996-97

NCAA

Manual, supra

to

note 128, at 32-33 (allowing

members or

nonmember institutions and organizations to send visiting delegates who lack voting privileges and
are denied the right to participate).

269.

While NCAA

institutions

could offer such programs
Carter, supra note 4.

in

have

in

recent years offered "life skills" programs, a nonprofit

an environment untainted by clear conflicts of interest. See generally

5
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retirement accounts. Such a plan would encourage student-athletes to save for
270
the future while teaching them financial planning and investment principles.

Whatever the approach, removing the power over any such assets from NCAA
and institutional jurisdiction would better serve interests of student-athletes, the
institutions, and athletics in general.
While nonprofit organizations are restricted from political lobbying activity,

NCAA

itself has demonstrated, nonprofits can engage in much
as the
information-providing activity on legislative matters without violating lobbying
271
For example, a nonprofit could provide information to Congress and
laws.

on public issues relevant to student-athlete interests in
Additionally, a nonprofit could review or propose governmental
athletics.
legislation to provide alternative perspectives on the impact on student-athletes.
governmental

entities

A nonprofit could support the student-athlete organization with their own voices
on

issues and conduct the research necessary to assess and mon itor whether those

voices are being heard and, indeed, what they are saying.
Certainly, while student-athletes have many interests in common, there are
conflicts that raise the question of whether a single nonprofit is workable. From
the institutional perspective a single nonprofit might be best because there would
be only one institution to deal with and that institution would be required to

compromise among competing

why one

student-athlete interests.

But this writer sees no

on monopoly control over studentathlete issues. Indeed, there are several coaches associations asserting the
interests of various subgroups of coaches, for example, black coaches and female
coaches and tennis coaches. Why then should student-athletes be more limited
in their options? One could make an excellent argument that some groups need
an organization more than others. For example, for some, football players or
African American athletes might fall into the category of those suffering most
under the perversion of in loco parentis. On the other hand, existing structures
that target the interests of specific groups, like the Women's Sports Foundation,
can continue to support those groups. The financial support for such an
enterprise in the market and the needs of student-athletes will be sufficient to
determine whether one nonprofit or more than one emerges. Moreover, multiple
reason

should reasonably

insist

nonprofits can be involved in the enterprise at different levels.
C.

Funding

There are numerous sources of funding for such a nonprofit. One very
obvious source is former student-athletes who desire to offer support. Another
is
contributions from both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations.
Governmental grants and general public support are other options. Finally, of
course, the NCAA and member institutions themselves have means of granting
some support to such an organization It would be best, of course, if such an

96-97.

270.

See

27 1

The NCAA has a Washington D.C.

on key

id. at

issues relevant to athletics. See

id. at

office that regularly

24-25.

communicates with Congress

.
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organization were broadly-supported. Broad support would avoid concerns that
the group answers to only a small group of donors and also would achieve the
preferred IRS exemption classification of a "public charity."
D.

NCAA

272

Regulatory Barriers: In Loco Parentis— Again!

There are definite regulatory barriers to what
the difficulty are two broadly-defined

amateurism and the principle of institutional

propose here. At the heart of

I

NCAA

principles:

control.

273

the principle of

Let us discuss them in

turn.

As

the Sports Illustrated matter indicated, the definition of amateurism

NCAA

exceedingly broad. The rules provide that
274
amateurs may not receive compensation for their athletic ability.
By providing
educational or other services at no charge to student-athletes only, might my
nonprofit be charged with providing a benefit based upon their athletic ability?
Of course, one can only reach an affirmative conclusion if one embraces the
NCAA's very broad definition of what it means to "use" one's athletic ability. 275
For illustration, consider the following example. Suppose a nonprofit
initiated a lawsuit charging institutions and the NCAA with violations of studentathlete rights. Suppose that, because these students lacked money, the nonprofit
arranged to cover the cost of the representation or hired a lawyer who would take
the case free of charge, perhaps relying upon the hope of a statutory fee award
for payment. Could this assistance be considered "compensation" for athletic
276
skills, a violation of NCAA rules on amateurism?
What of the principle of institutional control? Would an institution be
penalized if it "permitted" its student-athletes to be involved with a nonprofit
(assuming the nonprofit's activities with student-athletes are not specifically

embraced

in

exempted by

the

rules

is

NCAA

existing rules)?

require

rules

member

educational

institutions to assert control over their athletic programs. For example,

when any

booster of the institution violates NCAA rules, the institution has violated the
principle of institutional control by failing to prevent the act.
Indeed, a person can become a booster or more properly, a representative
of institutional interests without being an employee of the institution, without

—

—

272.

U.S.C.

Public charities are broadly-supported entities under the Internal Revenue Code. 26

§ 509(a)(2) (1994).

By

contrast, private foundations, while exempt, are not broadly

supported and, thus, are subject to more taxation, restrictions and reporting requirements than
public

charities.

273
control);

26 U.S.C.

See, e.g. ,
id. at

be designed

§ 507-509.

200 1 -02 DIVISION

I

MANUAL, supra

5 (principle of amateurism).

A

to vindicate the specific principles.

principles, see also

id. at

3-5; Carter,

note

1

77, at 3 (principle of institutional

"genera!" principle sets out that the legislation shall

supra note

The
4, at

specific principles follow.

13-14.

274.

2000-0 1

NCAA Division

275.

See

72 (stating the rule covers both "directfl" and "indirectf]"

id. at

I

Manual, supra

the Sports Illustrated case discussed supra Part
276.

See 200 1 -02

NCAA Division

I

III.

For the other

note

1

77, at 72-74.

A.

Manual, supra

note

1

77, at 72.

use).

Consider also
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the institution's formal permission and without actually recognizing that he or

The person need only act to benefit the institution's athletic
program in a way that violates the rules. The rationale behind this rule is not so
much amateurism, but parity. The theory is that when an institution's athletic
she has become

so.

interests are so advanced, that institution gains a competitive advantage over
277

some

have retreated
example,
when
For
it could be
somewhat
shown that the athlete had a preexisting personal relationship with the person
providing the benefits and that the benefits were thus not athletically-related, the
other institutions.

In response to

resistance, institutions

from these broad interpretations.

277.

This was the approach in the case involving

Dan Calloway, a

Florida youth sports

who provided money to student-athletes. Calloway was not a formal member of a booster

director

club and claimed that he provided the money solely because he had an interest
student-athletes. See, e.g.,

Mar.

1997, at

6,

4G

Matt Winkeljohn, Georgia

NCAA

helping minority

ATLANTA

Probation,

J.

CONST.,

(mentioning Calloway by name). However, in an investigation, the

infractions committee alleged that the

November 993 when he
1

Georgia

's

in

unnamed Calloway had

in fact

NCAA

become a booster

in

obtained high-school transcripts of prospects and provided them to

football coaches.

The

individual later paid for and helped several prospects with official visits to

Georgia and attendance

at

Georgia's football camps.

The committee received no

evidence that the Georgia coaching staff knew about the funds the booster provided to
the prospects. However, Georgia did receive a recruiting advantage from the efforts of
the booster.

News Release, NCAA,
(Mar.

University ofGeorgia Receives

Two

Years Probation/or NCAA Violations

5, 1997), http://www.ncaa.org/releases/makepage.cgi/infractions/1997030501in.htm.

Having

found that Calloway had acted as a booster with respect to five athletes, the NCAA then determined
that all of his actions with respect to student-athletes, even those as to

engage

in "recruiting,"

were

violations.

Among

the support that

whom he did not specifically

Calloway was found to have

provided was the following:

He obtained high school transcripts of five prospects for Georgia's football coaches.
He provided cash to nine prospects on a number of occasions. He purchased meals for
five prospects
football

on two occasions. He paid

for five prospects to attend the university's

camp and paid for three prospects to

From August 1994

visit the

Georgia campus.

to January 1995, the booster paid at least $7,000 for tuition,

room, board and spending money to a walk-on football player.
Id.

In addition to being placed on

two years probation, the Georgia

reduction in the number of athletic scholarships

Calloway was also implicated

News

Release,

NCAA,

it

could

offer.

football

Id.

another investigation involving Michigan State University.

in

Michigan State University Receives Four Years Probation for

Violations (Sept. 16, 1996) (noting that Calloway did not intend to
representative but that coaches sought

him

to

a

advantage),

recruiting

consistently claimed that he

he was and

is free

was not

in general,

to give

it.

become an

him out because of his prominence

in

NCAA

institutional

community and used

http://www.ncaa.org/releases/makepage.cgi/infractions/

1996091602IN.htm. Michigan State also suffered a reduction

minority student-athletes

program suffered a

in scholarships. Id.

Calloway has

representing any university's interests, that he

was helping

and that if a student asked his opinion about a particular school

See, e.g., Winkeljohn, supra.
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NCAA has suggested no penalty would be warranted.

Generally, however, such
relationship can only be proven by the student-athlete taking the risk and then
suffering an investigation.

278

Nevertheless, the institutional control rule could be a problem for my
if its activities conflict with
rules. For example, could this
organization be characterized as a "booster" if it identified a particular college's

NCAA

nonprofit

assistance to athletes as inadequate and provided academic support to those
athletes?

Could student-athletes affiliate with an
organization that obtains a substantial part of its support from contributions by
professional players (most of whom used to be student-athletes) without running
afoul of NCAA amateurism rules or without subjecting their institutions to
institutional control objections? Would substantial financial support from
professional players cause the NCAA to categorize the group as a "professional
sports organization?" Student-athletes are prohibited from receiving support
from professional sports organizations unless expressly allowed by the NCAA. 279
Certainly, it is in the nonprofit's interest to receive broad financial support and
280
not be beholden to a small group of donors.
But some of its donors might very
well be classes of persons to whom the NCAA and its members might object if
these persons had direct relationships with student-athletes. On the other hand,
Consider yet another quandary.

Compare the Calloway cases, supra note 277, to the case involving Ed Martin's contacts

278.

with University of Michigan players.

As

reported in the Detroit

News, an

internal report

by the

University of Michigan prior to the infractions committee action found that Martin, in

some players or

likelihood, gave

their families rent for apartments, party

transportation, basketball shoes, and other goods.

Jeff Taylor,

On

Answers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 25, 1997.

rooms

Michigan

Still

all

in hotels, free

Searching for

the other hand, the university's internal

knew the players for years before they went to Michigan
them. Thus, it argued that Martin was not technically a

investigation report indicated that Martin

and did not help Michigan

recruit

representative of the university 's athletic interests. Fred Girard,

U-M

's

Fate Tied to Martin:

His Status with University, DETROIT NEWS, Oct.

NCAA

Will

Study Probe

did,

however, find other violations of NCAA rules and responded by dismissing Michigan's head

coach.

Nicholas

Apologize for

Results, Interpret

J.

Coach Responds

Cotsonika, Ex-Michigan

Who I Am", WASH. POST, Oct.

1

4,

1

997. In 2000, Martin

gambling operations and alleged money laundering. The basis

Ben Schmitt

incidents involving Michigan student athletes.

Gambling Ring, DETROIT NEWS, Mar.
279.
12.1.1 .4.7,

2000-01 DIVISION
id.

at

I

to Firing; Fisher:

10, 1997.

"I Will

It

Not

was prosecuted for alleged

for the charges included the

et al., U.S.

1997

Charges Martin Ran a

22, 2002.

NCAA

Manual, supra

note 177, at 69.

But see

NCAA

Rule

72 (allowing charities that receive funding from professional sports organizations

to pay for low-income, at-risk student-athletes' attendance at a "camp or clinic" (but not to

pay for

prospective student-athletes) and allowing payment only for reasonable expenses, apparel and

equipment). Note that the rule seems to assume that the camp would be an athletic one. Note also
that the rule refers to charities payingfor
charities.

The reader

is

reminded that

camps;

camps. All such camps, of course, are subject
280.

26 U.S.C.

it

is

institutions

§ 501(c)(3) (1994).

to

not targeted toward camps that are run by the

and coaches often sponsor

their

own

athletic

NCAA limitations on "outside activities."
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NCAA's

institutions, with the

blessing, have

91

worked closely with professional

sports organizations and permitted students to have contact with professional

when

sports organizations

NCAA's own

promoted, or

it

at least, did

not jeopardize, the

interests.

One can argue convincingly that there are individuals and organizations with
bad intentions who should be kept away from student-athletes. Furthermore, it
is fair

to say that schools have a legitimate interest in the "amateur"

game

and,

281

have the right to set reasonable terms for participation in it.
On the
other hand, as I have stated, historically amateurism had two sides: both student
Chief among the institution's
and the institution had responsibilities.
responsibilities was to provide athletics for all and to avoid commercialization
of athletics and student-athletes. It is undeniable that NCAA institutions have
282
and, that
abandoned this earlier strong commitment to amateurism,
commercialism and control of athletics (with various ends) has become a key
concern. Therefore, in this new environment, it is time to consider what parts of
amateurism regulations applied to student-athletes can still be justified, not as an
afterthought tagged on to discussions about institutional rights, but as a central
283
question.
It is also time to acknowledge that in the search for "control," the
NCAA and its members have swept far too broadly. 284
When we speak of the potential of nonprofits, a key concern for NCAA
members who are publicly-funded institutions should lie the free speech area.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment assures not only the
freedom to speak but also the freedom to associate and that the freedom to
associate in an organization for the advancement of a point of view is a
285
fundamental right.
Because of this freedom, the government and its entities
cannot forbid membership in a group. Generally, it also cannot require that the
286
organization reveal the names of the members of such a group.
Such required
the
of
reprisal
will
have
chilling
revelations are barred because
fear
a
effect upon
membership and upon individual association rights. The courts have also long
recognized that the First Amendment includes the right to receive information as
well as provide it. Thus, in Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States,
therefore,

28 1

See discussion of the right/privilege distinction supra note 1 72 and accompanying text.

282.
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first

may be

a

of the "specific"

institutional control

nine on a

list

is

little

more than

ironic that the principle

of amateurism used to be the very

principles; see discussion supra, Part III.B, but today the principle

the

first

"specific" principle, while the principle of amateurism

of sixteen. 2001-02, Division

I

NCAA Manual, supra note

supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (concession to consider

is

of

number

177, at 3-5. See also

athletic ability in

awarding

scholarships).

283.

See discussion supra, Part

284.

See generally Carter, supra note

III.B (obligation
4, for

of institutions under amateurism).

a survey of the battle for constitutional control

of athletics.
285.

E.g.,

Buckley

promote common
Patterson,

286.

v.

beliefs),

Valeo, 424 U.S.

1

motion granted by 424 U.S. 936 (1976);

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.

money to
Alabama ex rel.

(1976) (regarding freedom to contribute

NAACP v.

1

.
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Court struck down a federal law permitting the postmaster to pull and hold
mail appearing to be communist propaganda until the addressee specifically
the

287

be delivered.
Lamont held that the
requirement of returning the card imposed an undue burden on the individual's
288
The Court has made it clear that the "right to
right to receive information.
receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient 's meaningful exercise of
289
his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom."
Indeed, in a concurring
opinion in Lamont, Justice Brennan observed the link between the right of free
speech and the right to receive information stating that "[i]t would be a barren
290
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."
291
As I have noted earlier, these First Amendment rights apply to students as
292
well.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the role of free speech on
campuses as central to the educational mission. 293 Thus, educational institutions
will have difficulty justifying broad restrictions on speech and association as
serving some kind of "educational" purpose. The courts have been particularly
suspicious of prior restraints on speech that require that speakers receive license
to speak before speaking. Thus, any requirement that the student check with the
institution first before speaking or associating could operate as a presumptively
294
invalid prior restraint on speech.
Certainly, where the speech is greatly disruptive courts have been willing to
295
permit restrictions on access.
However, there is no legitimate reason for
assuming that student-athlete involvement with a nonprofit would be disruptive
in the sense of these cases.
It must further be remembered that the association and speech rights belong
not only to the athlete but also to the nonprofit. It has a right to provide
296
information as much as student-athletes have the right to receive it.
returned a reply card asking that

it

287.

381 U.S. 301 (1965).

288.

Id. at

289.

Bd. of Educ, Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26

307.
v. Pico,

457 U.S. 853, 867

(1982).

308 (Brennan,

290.

Lamont, 381 U.S.

29 1

See discussion supra Part

292.

See, e.g., Pico,

books from school
views expressed
293.

library

at

457 U.S.

J.,

concurring).

III. A.

at

870-71 (finding that board of education

may

not remove

approved by parent-teacher group merely because board disagrees with

in them).

Pickering

v.

Bd. of Educ, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian

v.

Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.

589(1967).
N.Y. Times Co.

294.

See, e.g.,

295.

See, e.g.,Kreimerv.

library could bar person

from

v.

United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).

Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242(3dCir. 1992) (holding that public

library for failure to observe rules

of conduct while inside

library);

Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972) (upholding university action against teacher
belittled colleagues

296.

and

who

initiated frequent disputes).

Reaffirming this view, the Supreme Court decided

Tract Society of New York

v.

Village ofStratton, 122 S. Ct.

at press

time Watchtower Bible

&

2080 (2002) (upholding society of

Jehovah's Witnesses challenge to prohibitions and limitations on pamphleting and soliciting

at
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Of course,

only state actors can be sued for constitutional violations. The
has successfully argued that it is not itself a state actor and has won
297
As a result, in the past,
dismissal from many cases brought against it.
publicly-funded institutions were likely to find themselves the sole defendants
in lawsuits based on constitutional grounds. However, as I have argued in
Student-Athlete Welfare, this greater delegation of legislating power in Division

NCAA

I

after restructuring

and other

factors

non-state-actor status vulnerable.

now make

the

NCAA's

assertion of

298

Privately-funded institutions also

may

not be exempt from concerns

noted above, after the student protests of the 1960s, many
private colleges adopted statements of student rights and responsibilities that
299
Arguably,
essentially protected student freedom of speech and association.
these protections are a part of the student's contract with the college or

discussed here.

As

300

Indeed, as also noted earlier, accrediting agencies often seek
assurances of an environment that welcomes free speech and association as a
university.

prerequisite to accreditation.

All of these considerations support a view that students should not be

prohibited from voluntarily joining such an organization (if

it

is

organization), or, alternatively, taking advantage of its benefits.

a membership

They should be

long as all
permitted to join regardless of who the other members
members support its purposes. Also, student-athletes should not be required to
inform their institutions of their membership, and the organization should not
reveal its membership lists to these institutions. The schools should not be
permitted to condition student-athlete eligibility on a requirement that the student
are, so

provide information about the organization's activities or other members.
Students should be able to receive from such an organization any benefits
directed at remedying perceived abuses in athletics, free of institutional
meddling. The First Amendment supports this view, but also there may be
justification for defense of such associations and interactions of other legal
fields.

301

private homes); see also

grounds

state

NAACP v.

Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1961) (rejecting on First

of Alabama's refusal to grant business license to

NAACP and

its

Amendment

ban on

NAACP

activities in that state).

NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S.

297.

See
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See Carter, supra note

suggesting that the

claims requiring

it

new

4, at

179, 182 (1988).

81-89 (arguing for a narrow reading of Tarkanian and

legislative structure

under restructuring

may make

NCAA vulnerable to

state action).
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See supra notes

14-26 and accompanying

text.

300.

See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying

text.

301.

The legal possibilities are too numerous and too complicated to explore here. However,

1

may briefly be said that interference with an organization's attempts to reach student-athletes may

have an

effect

in the law, the

on the marketplace that would have antitrust implications. Despite

NCAA has been the subject of successful antitrust challenges.

4 (discussing Law v.

NCAA and NCCA v. Board ofRegents).

and conspiracy law may

also be implicated.

its

special status

See Carter supra note

State and Federal Civil Rights statutes
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Perhaps institutions could argue that unfettered associational opportunities
with nonprofits could jeopardize student welfare and amateurism because, absent
institutional monitoring, student-athletes will fall prey to jackals. Perhaps it
would be argued that the "product" that is intercollegiate amateur athletics cannot
exist without such far reaching restraints on student conduct, and that
competitive parity principles would be jeopardized as institutions sought to take
302
advantage of this brave new world.
But the historical failure of member
institutions to protect student-athlete welfare arouse suspicions about
institutional supervision of student-athletes. Some would compare it to the
proverbial wolf guarding the henhouse. NCAA position changes on amateurism
over the years challenge assumptions about amateurism' s unchangeable nature
and its sacred status. Moreover, while the NCAA may be free, as a private entity,
to determine through its divisions what it believes amateurism is, it should not
be free to determine the fundamental rights of student-athletes in the regimes it
establishes. It should also not have the special aid of the courts in upholding
overly-broad standards that are driven primarily by commercial interests.
As I have argued elsewhere in Student-Athlete Welfare, the rationale for
strong deference to educational institutions

where

in intercollegiate athletics is

student-athlete controls are concerned.

suspect

303

Perhaps one solution to preserving NCAA values and interests is for the
NCAA to enter into agreements with other nonprofits. And even if some
measure of control is truly essential to preserving amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics, (and if having reached that conclusion, we decide that we still wish to
preserve it), the perverted form of in loco parentis must be replaced with a new
conception of student-athlete/institution rights. Perhaps that conception will be
a modified in loco parentis doctrine more akin to contract and duty and more
closely resembling the legal relationships that exists between institutions and
their non-athlete students. Perhaps in a system that is supposed to be tied to
education, we really do not wish student-athletes to have to fend for themselves
304
in the way that professional-athletes must do, particularly on matters of safety.
But if in loco parentis to any degree remains, the new conception must also
recognize that with any degree of control, comes a duty to protect. And the new
conception must have teeth, affording student-athletes a real remedy, legal or
otherwise, if the institution fails in its duty. Better yet, the new conception must
allow outside groups to provide assistance to the student-athlete and the NCAA
to avoid situations which would lead to litigation. Nonprofits can play a vital
role in this mission.

302.

The argument has been made

majority in

NCAA v. Board of Regents,

its

if

in the antritrust context.

As

468 U.S. 120 (1984), while

I

have noted elsewhere, the

rejecting

NCAA restraints on

members in that case, opined that some horizontal restraints on commercial activity are necessary

the "product" of intercollegiate athletics

whether

is

restraints, antitrust or otherwise, are

to be available at

all.

However, as

necessary in a given case, turns on

I

also indicated,

how one

defines

"the product" to be preserved. See Carter, supra note 4, at 72-73.

69-95 (discussing judicial deference).

303.

See generally

304.

Taking such an approach has broad implications for other doctrines such as assumption

of risk.

id. at
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Conclusion
have claimed that the original in loco parentis doctrine had three legs: a
control leg, a welfare leg, and a deference leg. As athletics grew in importance
at educational institutions, the control leg was strengthened and the welfare leg
weakened. With continued judicial deference to institutions, this phenomenon
resulted in a distorted in loco parentis doctrine and an imbalance in the
relationship between institutions and their student-athletes. This trend was
contrary to the larger national trend toward reduced control of students and less
judicial deference to exercises of that control.
I

Intercollegiate athletics continues to operate in distorted in loco parentis

space. Arguably financial concerns have always played a role in the in loco

when Berea College, discussed above, forbade
students to have their meals off campus, one of the concerns was that financially,

parentis doctrine. For example,

Berea could not continue to provide a meal plan if students were not required to
305
participate in it.
However, difference between the world of 1 930 and the world
of today is that the in loco parentis doctrine has long been abandoned with
respect to the larger student population. It is unlikely today that any educational
institution could successfully defend in court what Berea did either against
student challenge or against litigation. Another big difference between Berea's
control and that of institutions controlling intercollegiate athletics is that it does
not appear that Berea continued a meals program purely because of its financial
value to the university. Instead, Berea likely viewed the policy of group meals
as intricately tied to its mission of providing students with an education in a
collegiate setting.
It is

possible to argue that, in the

name of keeping intercollegiate athletics an

of education, institutions should be permitted to exercise broader
controls over student-athletes than over nonathletes. Evidence suggests that
without some controls intercollegiate athletics can get out of hand. It is also
possible to argue that amateurism has value. But to sustain these arguments
lawyers and the courts must not only define what they mean by "amateurism,"
they must also redefine the relationship between the student-athlete and his or her
institution.
If intercollegiate athletics is to remain under the control of
institutions, the welfare leg of in loco parentis must be rebuilt or replaced with
some suitable modern substitute and the control and deference legs of the
doctrine must be shortened to restore its balance. Whatever happens, as long as
commercialism plays a major role in intercollegiate athletics, student-athletes
will need and have a right to access to information and assistance outside of their
institutions. A nonprofit, or perhaps a group of several nonprofits, is the most
viable option for providing that information and assistance.
integral part

—
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